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I. INTRODUCTION
Involuntary commitment' for sexually violent predators2 became the
law in California in 1996.? This law, the Sexually Violent Predator Act,4
provides for a civil jury trial.! This trial is unique, since some of the
procedural protections afforded a criminal defendant apply. For
example, a unanimous jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the individual is a sexually violent predator.6
1. The commitment is for a two-year period, reviewable after one year. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6605 (West 1998).
2. A "[s]exually violent predator" is defined as:
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or
more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has
a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and
safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent
criminal behavior.
Id. § 6600(a).
3. See 1995 Cal. Stat. 762 § 1. The law was enacted in 1995 and became
effective Sept. 13, 1996. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600.
4. Id. §§ 6600-6609.3.
5. See id. § 6603(b). However, if a trial by jury is not requested, a "trial before
the court without a jury" will be provided. Id. § 6603(c).
6. See id. § 6604. This section provides:
The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
person is a sexually violent predator. If the court or jury is not satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator, the
court shall direct that the person be released at the conclusion of the term for
which he or she was initially sentenced, or that the person be unconditionally
released at the end of parole, whichever is applicable. If the court or jury
determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be
committed for two years to the custody of the State Department of Mental
Health for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility
designated by the Director of Mental Health, and the person shall not be kept
in actual custody longer than two years unless a subsequent extended
commitment is obtained from the court incident to the filing of a new petition
for commitment under this article or unless the term of commitment changes
pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 6605. Time spent on conditional release
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The Act provides for the treatment of the individual if committed,7 and
carefully crafts the procedures for the mental health evaluation and
review process. Unfortunately, the part of the statute that provides for
the civil trial is not as tightly drafted. Consequently, it is subject to
some internal inconsistencies requiring clarification and statutory
interpretation. This Article will address several problems in this area
with specific recommendations to resolve those issues and clarify what
elements should be subject to proof at trial. However, before any
attempt to interpret the law is undertaken, the historical roots of the
Sexually Violent Predator Act must be explored as an aid to that
interpretation. The Act was enacted due to a profoundly serious problem
of such magnitude that, prior to its legislation, three related federal
statutes were enacted.8
As will be shown, statistics available to law enforcement on both the
state and federal level revealed an alarming growth in the number of
sexually violent offenders. Additionally, several experts in the mental
shall not count toward the two-year term of commitment, unless the person is
placed in a locked facility by the conditional release program, in which case
the time in a locked facility shall count toward the two-year term of
commitment. The facility shall be located on the grounds of an institution
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.
Id.
7. See id. § 6606. This sections provides:
(a) A person who is committed under this article shall be provided with
programming by the State Department of Mental Health which shall afford the
person with treatment for his or her diagnosed mental disorder.
(b) Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any person is a
person described in Section 6600, nor is it required for treatment of that
person. Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or
potentially successful, nor does it mean that the person must recognize his or
her problem and willingly participate in the treatment program.
(c) The programming provided by the State Department of Mental Health in
facilities shall be consistent with current institutional standards for the
treatment of sex offenders, and shall be based on a structured treatment
protocol developed by the State Department of Mental Health. The protocol
shall describe the number and types of treatment components that are provided
in the program, and shall specify how assessment data will be used to
determine the course of treatment for each individual offender. The protocol
shall also specify measures that will be used to assess treatment progress and
changes with respect to the individual's risk of reoffense.
Id.
8. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994) [hereinafter Jacob Wetterling Act]; Megan's
Law, id. § 14071(d); Pam Lyncher Offender Tracking and Identification Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14072(b) (Supp. IV 1998) [hereinafter Pam Lyncher Act].
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health field have concluded that the rate of recidivism for sexually
violent predators has been greatly underestimated. The combination of
these factors, the occurrence of several infamous crimes by individuals
on parole, and the public's demand for more restraints for sex offenders
about to be paroled, presaged the new law.
Each of these historical factors will be explored first, since it is only
when one fully understands the problem that the answer (the Sexually
Violent Predator Act) can be correctly interpreted.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
A. Federal and State Legislation
Public outrage has often been the catalyst for the creation of new laws.
In fact, a combination of media coverage of emotionally charged high-
profile stories, the public's outraged response, and the repetition of the
same type of conduct which heretofore was not a crime, but which
presents a high level of danger to public safety, has often resulted in the
creation of a new law. Crimes such as stalking,9 carjacking,'0 drive-by
shootings," and terrorist threats 2 are all relatively new laws that arose in
that manner.
The creation of the Sexually Violent Predator Act has much the same
genesis. The public's moral outrage, and corresponding media coverage,
which occurred in response to a series of violent and highly publicized
sexual assaults, resulted in the enactment of several new federal laws.
Two of the three cases culminated in murder, and, in each case, the
offense was committed by an individual who had an extensive prior
sexual criminal history and had recently been released from prison. The
kidnapping and presumptive murder of Jacob Wetterling, whose body
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1999).
10. See id. § 215.
11. See id. § 417.3; id. §12022.55
12. See id. § 422.
13. See Introduction to NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, at
vii, vii (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1998). In discussing the issue of registering sex offenders
one commenter noted:
Americans have become increasingly angry in recent years in response to a
series of violent and highly publicized sexual assaults, primarily against
children, committed by individuals with extensive prior sexual offense
histories. This outrage has been intensified by the perception... that systems
traditionally used by justice agencies to monitor law-breakers returned to the
community do not adequately protect the public from that unique category of
individual known as the sex offender.
Jan M. Chaiken, Forvard to NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEx OFFENDER REGIsTRiEs,
supra, at v, v.
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has never been recovered, 4 the sexual assault and murder of Megan
Kanka by a neighbor who, unknown to her family, was a twice-
convicted pedophile,"5 and the sexual assault of Pam Lyncher by a twice-
convicted felon 6 each resulted in the creation of several statutes on both
the federal and state levels. The three federal laws, the Jacob Wetterling
Act, 7 Megan's Law, 8 and the Pam Lyncher Act, 9 collectively require
the states to strengthen the procedures they use to keep track of sex
offenders.20
The main objective of the Jacob Wetterling Act2e ' is to protect the
public from sex offenders and child molesters through registration
requirements.22 It requires sexually violent predators and other sexual
offenders to register their current residence with local authorities. 2 The
registration requirement is intended to control crime and prevent
recidivism by making sex offenders readily available for police
surveillance at all times.24 This requirement is necessary because, as the
courts have acknowledged, sex offenders often have a transitory lifestyle
14. See Introduction to NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES,
supra note 13, at vii, vii.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).
18. Id. § 14071(d).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
20. See Jan M. Chaiken, Forward to NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at v, v (stating that all three statutes were designed to
strengthen state procedures for tracking sex offenders).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994).
22. See Office of the Attorney General, Dep't of Justice, Final Guidelines for the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act 4-6, 14, 17 (visited Aug. 6, 2000) <http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawollaws/jwaguide.
htm>.
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 14701(a)(1). This section provides that the Attorney General
must create guidelines that require that "a person who is convicted of a criminal offense
against a victim who is a minor or who is convicted of a sexually violent offense to
register a current address with a designated State law enforcement agency." Id. §
14701(a)(1)(A). The statute also states that "a person who is a sexually violent predator
[must] register a current address with a designated State law enforcement agency." Id. §
14701(a)(1)(B).
24. See People v. Franklin, 975 P.2d 30, 33 (Cal. 1999) ("Mhe registration act is
intended to promote the state's interest in controlling crime and preventing recidivism in
sex offenders by making them readily available for police surveillance at all times.");
Wright v. Superior Court, 936 P.2d 101, 104 (Cal. 1997) ("The purpose of section 290
[the sex offender registration act] is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes
enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because
the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future.") (citations
omitted).
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and deliberately attempt to keep their movements secret.'
The Jacob Wetterling Act places four obligations on the states: (1)
register the current addresses of sexual offenders and sexually violent
predators; 6 (2) maintain accurate registries;27 (3) maintain and distribute
registry information to law enforcement;8 and (4) disclose information
to the public when necessary to provide for public safety.
29
25. See Wright, 936 P.2d at 105 ("In large cities.., where offenders can easily
relocate without reregistering, section 290(f) seeks to prevent them from disappearing
from the rolls. Ensuring offenders are 'readily available for police surveillance' depends
on timely change-of-address notification." (quoting Barrows v. Municipal Court, 464
P.2d 483, 486 (Cal. 1970))).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a); see also supra note 23.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b). This sections provides that a registration program
must contain the following elements:
(A) If a person who is required to register under this section is released from
prison, or placed on parole, supervised release, or probation, a State prison
officer, or in the case of probation, the court, shall-
(i) inform the person of the duty to register and obtain the information
required for such registration;
(ii) inform the person that if the person changes residence address, the person
shall give the new address to a designated State law enforcement agency in
writing within 10 days;
(iii) inform the person that if the person changes residence to another State,
the person shall register the new address with the law enforcement agency with
whom the person last registered, and the person is also required to register with
a designated law enforcement agency in the new State not later than 10 days
after establishing residence in the new State, if the new State has a registration
requirement;
(iv) obtain fingerprints and a photograph of the person if these have not
already been obtained in connection with the offense that triggers registration;
and
(v) require the person to read and sign a form stating that the duty of the
person to register under this section has been explained.
Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A).
28. See id. § 1407 1(b)(2). This section provides:
(A) State reporting. State procedures shall ensure that the registration
information is promptly made available to a law enforcement agency having
jurisdiction where the person expects to reside and entered into the appropriate
State records or data system. State procedures shall also ensure that conviction
data and fingerprints for persons required to register are promptly transmitted
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(B) National reporting. A State shall participate in the national database
established under section 14072(b) of this title in accordance with guidelines
issued by the Attorney General, including transmission of current address
information and other information on registrants to the extent provided by the
guidelines.
Id.
29. See id. § 14071(e). This section discusses the release of information and
states:
(1) The information collected under a State registration program may be
disclosed for any purpose permitted under the laws of the State.
(2) The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person
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California was the first state to require sex offender registration.30 The
statute was first enacted in 1947."' The number of individuals required
to register in California grew steadily for the first forty years to
approximately 70,000 convicted sex offenders. 2 As of 1998, the figure
exceeded 77,000, which means, at that time, approximately 1 in every
150 adult males in California was required to register as a sex offender.
New sexual offender registrants amount to 3000 individuals annually,
and approximately 7000 individuals of those required to register have
never registered. 4 Of the 77,000 individuals who are required to register
in California, sixty percent were found guilty of sex offenses against
children.35  Currently, all fifty states have sex offender registration
laws.
36
required to register under this section, except that the identity of a victim of an
offense that requires registration under this section shall not be released.
Id.
The receipt of federal funding by the individual states is conditioned on compliance
with the Jacobs Wetterling Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A) ("A State that fails to
implement the program as described in this section shall not receive 10 percent of the
funds that would otherwise be allocated to the State under section 3756 of this tifle.").
30. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000). This section provides
for the registration of sex offenders and states:
Every person described in paragraph (2), for the rest of his or her life while
residing in, or, if he or she has no residence, while located within California, or
while attending school or working in California, as described in subparagraph
(G), shall be required to register with the chief of police of the city in which he
or she is residing, or if he or she has no residence, is located, or the sheriff of
the county if he or she is residing, or if he or she has no residence, is located,
in an unincorporated area or city that has no police department, and,
additionally, with the chief of police of a campus of the University of
California, the California State University, or community college if he or she is
residing, or if he or she has no residence, is located upon the campus or in any
of its facilities, within five working days of coming into, or changing his or her
residence or location within, any city, county, or city and county, or campus in
which he or she temporarily resides, or, if he or she has no residence, is
located.
Id. § 290(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
31. See Doug Smith, California's History of Sex Offender Registration
Requirements and Response to New Federal Mandates, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 64.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 65.
34. See id.
35. Third Reading, S.B. 2161, at 4 (Cal. 1996) (amended July 2, 1996).
36. See Norm Maleng, The Local Responsibility for Control and Prosecution of
Sex Offenders: Behind Washington State's History of Landmark Sex Offender Laws, in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 82.
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Megan's Law was enacted in 19963' in honor of Megan Kanka, and it
amended the Jacob Wetterling Act to make community notification of a
paroled sex offender in a community mandatory instead of
discretionary." California added its own Megan's Law in 1996.3' Only
three states-Kentucky, Nebraska, and New Mexico-currently do not
have community notification laws and do not allow access to sex
offender registration information. 4°
37. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
14071(d)). As initially drafted, Megan's Law provides:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as "Megan's Law".
SEC. 2. RELEASE OF INFORMATION AND CLARIFICATION OF
PUBLIC NATURE OF INFORMATION.
Section 170101(d) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 14071(d)) is amended to read as follows:
"(d) RELEASE OF INFORMATION. -
"(1) The information collected under a State registration program may
be disclosed for any purpose permitted under the laws of the State.
"(2) The designated State law enforcement agency and any local law
enforcement agency authorized by the State agency shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific
person required to register under this section, except that the identity of a
victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall not
be released.".
Id.
38. See Lisa Gursky Sorkin, The Trilogy of Federal Statutes, in NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 16, 17.
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999). Subdivision (in) of Penal Code
section 290 provides in relevant part:
(m)(1) When a peace officer reasonably suspects, based on information
that has come to his or her attention through information provided by any
peace officer or member of the public, that a child or other person may be at
risk from a sex offender convicted of a crime listed in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 290.4, a law enforcement agency may,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, provide any of the information
specified in paragraph (4) of this subdivision about that registered sex offender
that the agency deems relevant and necessary to protect the public, to the
following persons, agencies or organizations the offender is likely to
encounter, including, but no limited to, the following:
(A) Public and private educational institutions, day care establishments,
and establishments and organizations that primarily serve individuals likely to
be victimized by the offender.
(B) Other community members at risk.
(2) The law enforcement agency may authorize persons and entities who
receive the information pursuant to paragraph (1) to disclose information to
additional persons ...."
Id. § 290(m). Subdivision (n) of section 290 provides in relevant part: "In addition to the
procedures set forth elsewhere in this section, a designated law enforcement entity may
advise the public of the presence of high-risk sex offenders in its community pursuant to
this subdivision." Id. § 290(n).
40. See Scott Matson & Roxanne Lieb, MEGAN'S LAW: A REvIEW OF STATE AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATION, iii (1997).
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The Pam Lyncher Act:4 (1) obligates the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") to establish a national database to track the
whereabouts and movements of sex offenders;42 (2) requires the FBI to
handle sex offender registration in states which fail to meet minimum
requirements;43 and (3) amends the Jacob Wetterling Act to make sex
registration requirements more stringent. 4 The federal law requires
states to establish sex offender registration programs so that "local law
enforcement will know the whereabouts of sex offenders released into
their jurisdictions, and [community] notification programs so the public
can be warned about sex offenders living in the community.
'45
Even with these laws in place, public concern continued, fueled by the
perception, right or wrong, justified or not, that the current justice
system did not adequately address the need to protect the public from
41. Pam Lyncher Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14072); see also Introduction to
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at vii.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(b) (Supp. IV 1998). This act provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a national database at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to track the whereabouts and movement of-
(1) each person who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim
who is a minor;
(2) each person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and
(3) each person who is a sexually violent predator.
Id.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(c). This sections states:
Each person described in subsection (b) of this section who resides in a State
that has not established a minimally sufficient sexual offender registration
program shall register a current address, fingerprints of that person, and a
current photograph of that person with the FBI for inclusion in the database
established under subsection (b) of this section for the time period specified
under subsection (d) of this section.
Id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 14072(d). This section sets forth the requirements for the
length of registration and provides:
A person described in subsection (b) of this section who is required to register
under subsection (c) of this section shall, except during ensuing periods of
incarceration, continue to comply with this section-
(1) until 10 years after the date on which the person was released
from prison or placed on parole, supervised release, or probation; or
(2) for the life of the person, if that person-
(A) has 2 or more convictions for an offense described in subsection
(b) of this section;
(B) has been convicted of aggravated sexual abuse, as defined in
section 2241 of title 18 or in a comparable provision of State law; or
(C) has been determined to be a sexually violent predator.
Id.
45. Chaiken, supra note 13, at v.
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one specific group of violent offenders-the sexually violent predator.46
A sexually violent predator is an individual who is a member of a
subclass of the most highly dangerous violent offenders.47 They are the
least likely to be cured and the most likely to reoffend, and they prey on
the most vulnerable members of society-children and strangers.48 Even
though the Jacob Wetterling Act requires sexually violent predators to
register, neither that Act nor any other law requires treatment of the
individual, if needed, nor a determination of whether the person had a
mental abnormality or was a continuing threat to the community.
Additionally, no laws prevented the individual's release, even though the
individual needed treatment and presented a present danger to the safety
of others. In other words, none of the former laws addressed the fact
that sexually violent predators were being released, untreated, into
communities. The magnitude of the problem that confronted law
enforcement, in terms of the number of sexually violent predator
offenders who were being released into communities,49 and the statistical
information about their rate of recidivism were crucial factors which
46. See id.
47. See Lisa Gursky Sorkin, The Trilogy of Federal Statutes, in NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 16. Sexually violent
predators are subject to more stringent registration requirements than other sex offenders
under Federal and State law. Section 14072(e)(2) of the U.S. Code provides that
sexually violent predators "must verify the registration once every 90 days after the date
of the initial release or commencement of parole of that person." 42 U.S.C. §
14072(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). Subdivision (a)(1)(E) of Section 290 requires sexually
violent predators to register once every 90 days, and subdivision (f)(5) of the same
statute requires the sexually violent predator to verify his registration every 90 days.
"[The Jacob Wetterling Act] requires states to establish effective registration systems for
convicted child molesters and other sexually violent offenders. It also requires the
establishment of registration requirements for a subclass of the most highly dangerous
offenders, who are designated under the Act as 'sexually violent predators."' Lisa
Gursky Sorkin, supra note 13, at 16.
A sexually violent predator is defined as "a person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses."
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)(3)(C) (1994).
48. See Florence Shapiro, The Big Picture of Sex Offenders and Public Policy, in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 92-93. Because
the sexually violent predator is in a subclass of sexually violent offenders, the statistics
that apply to the latter also apply to the former.
49. The statistical information from the United States Department of Justice on
recidivism of sexually violent predatory offenders and other inmates, and the information
from California law enforcement, was referred to in the Senate and Assembly
discussions on the SVPA. See e.g., Assembly Committee on Public Safety, SB 536, Bill
Analysis (Cal. 1997); Sex Offender Registration: Certificate of Rehabilitation, Senate
Committee on Criminal Procedure, SB 2161, (Cal. 1996); Third Reading, S.B. 2161,
(Cal. 1996) (amended July 2, 1996); Senate Appropriations Committee, SB 1143, Bill
Analysis (Cal. 1995); Assembly Appropriations Committee, AB 888, Bill Analysis (Cal.
1995).
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influenced the enactment of the Sexually Violent Predator Act."
B. The Magnitude of the Problem
1. Statistics of Sexually Violent Offenders
No issue is as sensitive or as emotionally charged as the issue of
sexual assault. The intensity surrounding this issue is heightened even
more when the statistical information on the number of incidents of
sexual offenses, and the increase in the commission of sexual offenses,
is reviewed.
According to the United States Department of Justice, as of 1994,
there were approximately 906,000 offenders incarcerated in state prisons
nationwide.' Of that number, 88,000, or 9.7%, are violent sex
offenders.52 However, in 1980, only fourteen years earlier, of the then
295,819 offenders incarcerated in state prisons, 20,500, or 6.9%, were
violent sex offenders.
5 1
From 1980 to 1994, the number of prisoners in all categories of crimes
has increased by approximately 7.6% each year." However, the increase
50. A legislative statement is appended to the Act:
The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely dangerous group
of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders can be
identified while they are incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at large
and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in that they
are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. The Legislature further finds
and declares that it is in the interest of society to identify these individuals
prior to the expiration of their terms of imprisonment. It is the intent of the
Legislature that once identified, these individuals, if found to be likely to
commit acts of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt,
be confined and treated until such time that it can be determined that they no
longer present a threat to society.
The Legislature further finds and declares that while these individuals
have been duly punished for their criminal acts, they are, if adjudicated
sexually violent predators, a continuing threat to society. The continuing
danger posed by these individuals and the continuing basis for their judicial
commitment is a currently diagnosed mental disorder which predisposes them
to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. It is the intent of the
Legislature that these individuals be committed and treated for their disorders
only as long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive purposes.
1995 Cal. Stat. 763 § 1.
51. See LAWRENcE A. GREENFELD, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF DATA ON RAPE AND SExuAL ASSAULT 17 (Tom Hester & Yvonne Boston eds., 1997).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 19. The number of imprisoned rapists grew at an annual average of
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of violent sexual assault offenders, other than rapists, increased annually
by more than 15%." This rate of increase is faster than any other
category of violent crime, and second only to the increase of drug
offenders. 6 In fact, the most startling statistic is that, while the state
prison population increased 206% during that fourteen-year time period,
the increase in sexually violent offenders was a staggering 330%*
7
Though these are the most current statistics to date, even these figures
are no longer accurate. The most current information available from the
United States Department of Justice is that the number of sex offenders
in state prison as of 1998 is approximately 95,000.58 The Department of
Justice has not issued updated statistics on comparable figures for other
offenses, so current comparison rates of increase are unknown.
Unfortunately, the most recent figures available, which reflect the
number of sexual violent offenders nationwide, inside and outside state
prison, are from 1994." Those figures reveal that approximately
234,000 offenders convicted of a violent sexual crime are under the care,
custody, or control of state correctional agencies: ° Of that number,
approximately 58%, or more than 134,000 sexually violent predators, are
under conditional supervision in local communities, either on parole or
on probation.'
According to the California Department of Corrections, as of May
1995, there were approximately 11,000 sex offenders in local prisons.62
Of these, 250 are released each month, or approximately 3000 each
year.63  Among those released are predatory child molesters, forcible
rapists, and repeat violent sex offenders.64 Prior to the passage of the
Sexually Violent Predator Act, there was no mechanism or legal
authority to detain or to treat these individuals who are deemed the most
about 7%. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. Inmates serving time for drug offenses had an annual increase of 18%.
See id.
57. See id. at 17 n.2. ("Sexual assault includes convictions for statutory rape,
forcible sodomy, lewd acts with children, and other conviction offenses related to
fondling, molestation, or indecent practices.").
58. See Introduction to NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES,
supra note 13, at vii. Comparable statistical information is not available to date.
59. See GREENFELD, supra note 51.
60. See id. These figures are based on the background information obtained by the
U.S. Department of Justice from "more than two dozen statistical datasets maintained by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Uniform Crime Reporting Program of the FBI."
Id. at iii.
61. See id.
62. See Civil Commitment: Sexual Offenders, Senate Committee on Criminal
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dangerous because they are the most violent and the most likely to
reoffend.6
2. Recidivism Rates
The dangerousness of any sexually violent predator is assessed in
terms of the risk of reoffending.66 Therefore, studies of recidivism rates
for sexually violent offenders, which include sexually violent predators
as a subclass, reveal the danger to public safety targeted by the Sexually
Violent Predator Act.67
Initially, studies on recidivism rates performed by mental health
experts and government agencies appeared to contradict one another
because they produced different estimates of recidivism for violent
sexual offenders. 68  However, as will be shown, the reason for these
disparities was due to the methodological variables used.69  When
reconciled, the information strongly supports the conclusion that the rate
of recidivism for violent sexual offenders is higher than previously
65. See Sex Offender Registration: Certificate of Rehabilitation, Senate Committee
on Criminal Procedure, SB 2161, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996).
66. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998).
67. See 1995 Cal. Stat. 763 § 1.
68. This is referred to as the "base rate" which means "the known prevalence of a
specific type of violent behavior within a given population over a given time period."
Randy Borum, Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment:
Technology, Guidelines, and Training, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 945, 946 (1996).
69. See Robert A. Prentky et al., Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and
Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 635, 636 (1997). In this
article the authors noted:
Indeed, relatively little can be concluded from extant studies, primarily
because of the methodological variability of these studies. Indeed, studies
examining re-offense rates among sex offenders have varied in a number of
critical dimensions. Among these are: (a) the study sample; (b) the criterion
for recidivism, which includes the source of criterion information, the types of
outcome criminal activity assessed, and the operationalization of recidivism;
and (c) the length and consistency of the follow-up period.
Id. (citations omitted). See discussion infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text; see also
Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender Recidivism, and
the "Sexual Predator" Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 97, 110 (1998).
Unfortunately, almost all of this research [concerning risk factors] has
employed the outcome measure of sexual reconviction over relatively short
periods of time. Hence, most of what we currently know about risk factors
pertains to the prediction of sexual offense reconviction within the first five
years post-incarceration, rather than the more general and far more frequent re-
committing of a sexual offense within extended periods of time.
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estimated, and is subject to quantification. °
Those studies, which examine recidivism, use a selected group of
sexually violent offenders who have committed specified sexual offenses
against victims, and who are tracked for a period of time. Each of these
factors-the nature of the study group, the criteria used for recidivism,
the nature of the prior sexual offenses, the age and sex of the victims,
and the length of the follow-up period-affect the risk assessment.
71
For example, some studies define recidivism in terms of an arrest or a
conviction, and still others define recidivism through sentencing.
72
Those studies which use arrest as the criteria for recidivism will
necessarily omit the number of sexual offenses committed but not
reported, or instances which were reported but for which an arrest was
not made. Obviously, those studies which use sentencing as the
definition of recidivism ignore the incidents noted above as well as those
cases in which an arrest has occurred and a case is pending, or an arrest
was made and charges occurred but the case was dismissed, or an arrest
was made but a conviction was not obtained, or a conviction has
70. See Borum, supra note 68, at 947 ("However, current research has shown that
base rates for violence are considerably higher than was previously believed."). See also
Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 635. The authors stated:
The data indicate that: (a) both rapists and child molesters remain at risk to
reoffend long after their discharge, in some cases 15-20 years after discharge;
(b) there was a marked underestimation of recidivism when calculating a
simple proportion (%) consisting of those who were known to have reoffended
during the follow-up period, and (c) there was a marked underestimation of
recidivism when the criterion was based on conviction or imprisonment.
Id. See also R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Static 99: Improving Actuarial Risk
Assessments for Sex Offenders 1999-02, at 15 (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http:ll
www.sgc.gc.ca/epub/Corr/e199902.htm> ("Estimating absolute recidivism rates is a
difficult task since many sex offences go undetected .... Observed recidivism rates
(especially with short follow-up periods) are likely to substantially underestimate the
actual recidivism rates."); R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-Term Recidivism of Child
Molesters, 61 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 650 (1993) ("Although
reconviction rates were used as the recidivism criteria in this study, it is likely that
reconviction rates underestimate the rate of reoffending."); R. Karl Hanson & Monique
T. Bussidre, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism
Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 349 (1998) ("The absolute
recidivism rates vary across studies as a result of differences in follow-up periods,
definitions, and local criminal justice practices.").
71. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 653; Doren, supra note 69, at 99-100.
72. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND
THEIR VICTIMS 1, 4, 6-7 (1996) (looking at sentencing of offenders); Doren, supra note
69, at 101 (discussing a study done by Prentky in which recidivism was defined as a
"new sex offender charge"); Hanson et al., supra note 70, at 648 (declining to use
charges as an outcome criteria because these are not consistently recorded); R. Karl
Hanson et al., A Comparison of Child Molesters and Nonsexual Criminals: Risk
Predictors and Long-Term Recividism, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 325, 329 (1995)
(declining to use charges as a measure of recidivism because this information is not
consistently recorded).
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occurred but sentencing has not. Furthermore, if the new offense must
be a sexual offense, then those cases that resulted in a plea bargain to a
lesser included non-sexual offense, such as assault, or battery, would
also be omitted.73 Such definitional variations will necessarily affect
estimates of recidivism and will also significantly underestimate its
recurrence. As one authority noted:
The sexual predator laws uniformly specify only that there be a certain
probability that the person will recommit a defined "sexually predatory act," not
get caught, arrested, or especially reconvicted for that new act. Hence,
reconviction rates from professional research should be viewed as representing
significant underestimations of sex offender recidivism base rates relevant to
these commitment laws.74
Even with such shortcomings, some studies, when corrected for any
underestimation, have estimated the rate of recidivism at 72% for child
molesters and 52% for rapists.75
Any study which tracks sexual offenders for less than a five-year
period, according to several experts, would miss approximately two-
thirds of the new sexual offenses committed by child molesters and more
than half of the new offenses committed by rapists.76 This criticism is
borne out by studies performed by the U.S. Department of Justice.77 A
three-year follow-up of sex offenders showed that about one-half of both
rapists and sexual assaulters were rearrested for a new crime, more than
one-third were reconvicted, and more than one-quarter were
reimprisoned within the three-year follow-up. 78  However in the same
study, only "28% of released rapists were re-arrested for a new violent
73. See generally Hanson et al., supra note 70, at 648, 650 (including assault
convictions with explicitly sexual offenses because sex offense charges are commonly
reduced and noting that reconviction rates are generally understated because many
offenses do not result in conviction).
74. Doren, supra note 69, at 100. Yet another factor for underestimating
recidivism is that all of the research uses only male sex offenders since base rates for
female offenders have not been studied. See id.
75. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 651. In that study, recidivism was defined
in terms of a new criminal charge. See id. at 650. The recidivism rate was 52% for child
molesters with an underestimation of 20%, and 39% for rapists with an underestimation
of 13%. See id. at 651.
76. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 652. One study found a sexual recidivism
rate of 77% for child molesters. See Doren, supra note 69 at 111.
77. See GREENFELD, supra note 51, at 29; Jan M. Chaiken, Sex Offending:
Learning More From National Data Collection Programs, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 8, 12 (1998).
78. See GREENFELD, supra note 51, at 26.
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crime,"79 whereas a fifteen-year study detailed a recidivism rate from
49.4% to 63.8%.80 These figures reveal that the three-year study did
miss more than half of the new offenses, and because the criterion used
for recidivism was a new arrest, these figures underestimate the actual
rate of recidivism.
Another study followed 197 child molesters from sixteen to thirty-one
years after their release and used a conviction as the criteria for
recidivism.8' Of that number, 42% were reconvicted.8 2 The authors
acknowledged the figure most likely underestimated the rate of re-
offending and that it was possible that all reoffended but only half were
caught. 3 In fact, experts agree that meaningful base rates for recidivism
require that a subject group be followed for life."' Statistics demonstrate
that offenders reoffend as late as twenty or twenty-four years after
release and that the number of individuals who reoffend increases as
time passes."
Unfortunately, few studies have examined recidivism patterns of
offenders for a long term and even fewer have focused on child
molesters. In fact, it is recognized that only a fraction of actual offenses
against children result in the offender being convicted.86  Some
researchers have even concluded that most sexual assaults against
children are not reported. One study that followed child molesters for a
fifteen- to thirty-year period and compared them with a group of non-
sexual offenders, followed for the same period of time, concluded that
child molesters were responsible for 97% of the sexual offense
recidivism."
Other reasons for the lack of concurrence between statistical results is
that some studies do not include offenses where the victim was under the
age of twelve; others do not include male victims, and it appears that
some studies exclude female and juvenile offenders." For example, the
U.S. Department of Justice changed the questions used in the National
79. Id.
80. See Senate Committee on Public Safety, SB 2161, Third Reading, at 4 (Cal.
1996). This study was for a 15-year period from 1973 to 1988 and involved 1362 sex
offenders.
81. See Hanson et al., supra note 70, at 648.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 650.
84. See Doren, supra note 69, at 100; Hanson et al., supra note 70, at 650; Hanson
& Bussidre, supra note 70, at 358.
85. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 636.
86. See Hanson et al., supra note 70, at 650.
87. See R. Karl Hanson, How to Know What Works with Sexual Offenders, 9
SEXUAL ABUSE J. RES. & TREATMENT 129, 131 (1997).
88. See Hanson et al., supra note 72, at 332, 334.
89. See GREENFELD, supra note 51, at 1, 6.
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Crime Victimization Survey." This survey samples residents who are
asked questions about any crimes they may have experienced, whether
or not the crimes were reported.9' Originally, the questions were limited
to rape or attempted rape, but from 1992 to 1993 questions were phased
in about sexual assault.92 Based on the new questions, the "estimated
rates of rape and sexual assault... were about 4 times higher than
previously measured." 93 Additionally, of those surveyed, only 32%
reported the offenses to law enforcement.94 However, as a measure of
crime incidents, these figures are incomplete as well since only victims
of age twelve or older were included in the survey.95 When that
omission is compared to the fact- that incarcerated violent sexual
offenders admitted that two-thirds of their victims were under the age of
eighteen, and, of that number, 58% were under the age of twelve, 6 the
inescapable conclusion is that the reoffense risk has been greatly
underestimated.
Non-reporting of sexual crimes is also consistent with the fact that sex
offenders are less likely than other violent offenders to have a history of
prior conviction.97 Yet follow-up studies reveal that sex offenders are
substantially more likely than other violent offenders to be rearrested for
a new violent sex offense.98 For example, released rapists were found to
be 10.5 times as likely as non-rapists to be rearrested for rape." Of
"those who had served time for sexual assaults" they "were 7.5 times as
likely as those convicted of [non-sexual] crimes to be rearrested for a
new sexual assault."' °
Another factor listed above that affects the base rate of recidivism is
the sample selection characteristics of the study group.'0 ' Identified risk
factors include lifestyle, impulsivity, number of prior sex offenses,
anger, fixation, age, antisociality, and psychopathy.' °  Methodological




94. See id. at 2. This statistic is based on the years 1994 and 1995. See id.
95. See id. Thus any sex victim younger than 12 years of age was not counted.
96. See id. at 24.
97. See id. at 23.
98. See id. at 26.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 27.
101. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 652.
102. See id. at 654; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c) (discussing risk
factors considered by the Department of Mental Health to determine if the person is a
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variability of these factors in a selected group will impact reoffense
rates; for example, the higher the proportion of risk factors in any given
study group, the higher the reoffense rate, while a lower reoffense rate
will result with a study group that has a lower number of factors
present.' 3 Therefore, failure to note the presence of these factors in a
study increases the possibility of error.0
Statistical estimates from the United States Department of Justice on
child molesters are also consistent with the fact that recidivism is
underestimated.' 5 State prison inmates who reported having committed
their crimes against a child were more likely to have had multiple
victims.' O4 Based on the number of child victims reported by the state
inmates, the Department concluded that the more than 60,000 violent
offenders may have had as many as 95,000 victims.'07 Regardless of the
fact that violent child offenders admit to multiple victims, they had a less
extensive criminal history *than those offenders with adult victims.'
While four out of ten child victimizers had never been arrested prior to
their current offense, just over one-fourth of those who victimized adults
were serving time for their first offense." Both non-reporting and
underestimation of recidivism explain this inconsistency.
The distinguishing quality between child victims and adult victims is
the victim-offender relationship." "[A]dult victimizers are substantially
less likely to have had a prior relationship with their victim than...
those who committed their crimes against children.". This fact is
reflected in the definition of "predatory" in the law."1 According to
statistics promulgated by the Department of Justice, 86% of child
victimizers had a prior relationship with the victim."' "More than 40%
of offenders with child victims said the victim had been a relative or
member of their immediate family." 4 Of this number, three out of four
of the victims were the offender's child or stepchild."5 This is consistent
sexually violent predator).
103. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 654.
104. See id. at 656.
105. See GREENFELD, supra note 72, at 9.
106. See id.
107. See id. These figures were calculated in 1991. See id.
108. See id. at 4.
109. See id.
110. See id. at ll.
111. Id.
112. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(e) (West 1998) ("'Predatory' means an
act is directed toward a stranger, a person of casual acquaintance with whom no
substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.").
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with the fact that such individuals will use "complicated techniques for
obtaining access to" a potential victim, including a marriage."
6
"Compared to violent offenders with adult victims, child victimizers...
were 6 times as likely to have had a victim who was a relative ....
Conversely, adult victimizers were nearly 4 times more likely than child
victimizers to have had a victim who was a stranger to them-55%
versus 15%. ''..
Although experts may not agree on what is the correct percentage of
recidivism for violent sex offenders and predators, they do agree that
prediction of recidivism, and the approximate dangerousness of the
offender, is a realistic objective."' What is not possible is the
determination of the exact percentage of likelihood of reoffending for
any given individual."9
3. Legislative Intent
The Legislature concluded, based on the information obtained from
local and federal authorities, and mental health experts, that the state
needed "a(n) [involuntary] civil commitment procedure to allow the
state a means to place and treat sexually violent predators in a secure
mental facility following their release from prison."'20 "The problem
targeted by the Act is acute, and the state interests-protection of the
public and mental health treatment-are compelling.'' Prior to the
enactment of the Sexually Violent Predator Act, there was "no legal
authority to detain and treat sexually violent offenders who are likely to
commit new offenses because of their mental abnormality and defects.
There is no procedure to prevent the release into unsuspecting
116. AMERICAN PsYciIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 528 (4th ed. 1994).
117. GREENFELD, supra note 72, at 11.
118. See Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 656.
119. See id.; see also Doren, supra note 69, at 110 ("Only if and when a state refers
a percentage of sex offenders for possible commitment equal to, or greater than the
known recidivism base rates will the concept of a systematic over-prediction of sexual
predation become accurate.").
120. AB 888, Assembly Third Reading, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1995) (as amended May
31, 1995). Section 6250 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which applies
to the Sexually Violent Predator Act as well as others, provides: 'This part shall be
liberally construed so that, as far as possible and consistent with the rights of persons
subject to commitment, those persons shall be treated, not as criminals, but as sick
persons." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West 1998).
121. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 n.20 (Cal. 1999).
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communities of sexually violent offenders who have completed their
prison sentences. ' 2
Thus the intent of the Act is threefold. Without doubt, the primary
aim of the Act is the protection of the public.'" As stated earlier,
sexually violent predators prey on the most innocent and vulnerable
members of society. 12' Both the large number of sexually violent
offenders who exist both inside and outside of state prisons, and the fact
that their numbers have been increasing at an alarming rate,' impact on
the necessity to protect the public.
Secondly, the Act provides for the detention and treatment of
dangerous and violent sexual offenders.1 6 Prior to its enactment, there
was no procedure to treat these individuals. 27 Involuntary commitment
provides that vehicle. While experts disagree on the effectiveness of
treating some offenders, 28 at least some clinicians support the view that
long-term intensive community supervision and aftercare do affect
recidivism and should be used as an attempt at intervention. 9 In either
case, any positive effect on recidivism is a necessary and worthy
objective.
The final objective of the Act is to prevent and deter the alarming
number of sexually violent crimes committed by this legally and
medically recognizable class of sexually violent offenders.3 The Act
122. Sexually Violent Predators, Senate Rules Committee, SB 1143, Bill Analysis 5
(Cal. 1995).
123. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 587 n.5.
124. See Florence Shapiro, The Big Picture of Sex Offenders and Public Policy, in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 92-93.
125. See GREENFELD, supra note 51, at 4, 19-20.
126. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6606 (West 1998); see also Hubbart,
969 P.2d at 587 (noting that, through passage of the Act, California both hospitalizes and
treats offenders in addition to applying criminal sanctions).
127. "The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community
from the dangerous tendencies of some ...." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426
(1979).
128. See Jan M. Chaiken, Federal Funding Support for Sex Offender Registries, in
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 13, at 31, 32.
129. See Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated
Paraphiliacs, 2 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 23 (1987); Hanson et al., supra note 70,
at 646-52; Hanson & Bussidre, supra note 70, at 358; Hanson, supra note 87, at 129;
Prentky et al., supra note 69, at 655.
130. See Abel et al., supra note 129, at 11 (stating the "frequency of self-reported
crimes was vastly greater than the number of crimes for which subjects had been
arrested"); Howard E. Barbaree & William L. Marshall, Deviant Sexual Arousal, Offense
History, and Demographic Variables as Predictors of Reoffense Among Child Molesters,
6 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 267, 278 (noting that the likely reason for a lower number for
recidivism is that there are "underestimates of the actual percentages"); Hanson et al.,
supra note 70, at 650 ("It is widely recognized that only a fraction of the sexual offenses
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was promulgated to deter and prevent further sexually violent crimes.
As has been shown, the rate of recidivism among sexually violent




A sexually violent predator is one
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more
victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and
safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent
criminal behavior.
132
A "diagnosed mental disorder," in turn, is defined as "a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a
degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of
others.' 33  Evidence that the individual has in the past committed
sexually violent offenses and currently has a mental disorder which
predisposes him to commit sexually violent acts is probative of the
individual's potential dangerousness.
Predicting dangerousness in a legal setting is not a novel concept. In
fact, a legal determination, predicting that one may be dangerous in
some respect, based on previous behavior, has been accepted by the
courts.'35 Courts have traditionally viewed the fact that a person has in
against children result in the offender being convicted. Consequently, it is possible that
all of the men in our study could have reoffended but that only about one half got
caught.") (citation omitted); Hanson & Bussi6re, supra note 70 at 357 ("This recidivism
rate should be considered an underestimate because many offenses remain undetected.").
131. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
132. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West 1998). Several problems in this
definition are discussed infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
133. Id. § 6600(c).
134. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352 (1997); Hubbart v. Superior
Court, 969 P.2d 584, 600 (Cal. 1999). The Act provides that thefact that this likelihood
exists must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
6604 (West 1998).
135. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371 (1997) (discussing the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act, which provides for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent
predator and satisfies constitutional principles, and noting that the act permits
confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals, who "currently
both suffer[] from a 'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' and [are] likely to
pose a future danger to the public"); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (finding
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the past committed a criminal act as a sufficient indication of
dangerousness.136
Furthermore, each of the offenses that qualify an offender as a
sexually violent predator'37 are also offenses which require the individual
to register as a sex offender.' This registration requirement illustrates
that the Legislature has deemed that offenders convicted of sexually
violent crimes are likely to commit similar offenses in the future.'39
Even though the determination of dangerousness is a prediction,
subject to quantification, that alone does not preclude proving that
that the determination that an individual is dangerous because of previous instances of
violent behavior in the case of those who are mentally ill or mentally retarded could be
accomplished with some accuracy); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1986)
(acknowledging that mentally disordered sex offenders had propensities for the
commission of sex offenses); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (holding that
there was nothing "inherently unattainable" about the prediction of future criminal
conduct and explicitly rejecting the contention that it was impossible to predict future
behavior); Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 272, 274 (1940) (finding that"proof of a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters" shows "an utter lack of
power to control their sexual impulses," which points to the probability of its recurrence
as "susceptible of proof' (internal quotations omitted)).
136. See generally Heller, 509 U.S. at 323 ("Previous instances of violent behavior
are an important indicator of future violent tendencies."); Schall, 467 U.S. at 278
("[F]rom a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction
of future criminal conduct."); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) ("The
fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a
criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness.").
137. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b). This section provides:
"Sexually violent offense" means the following acts when committed by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person, and that are committed on, before, or after the
effective date of this article and result in a conviction or a finding of not guilty
by reason of insanity, as provided in subdivision (a): a felony violation of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 [forcible rape], paragraph (1)
of subdivision (a) of Section 262 [spousal rape], Section 264.1 [rape in
concert], subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 [lewd acts on children under
14], or subdivision (a) of Section 289 of the Penal Code [penetration by
foreign object], or sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or
288a of the Penal Code.
Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261,262, 264.1,288, 289, 286 (West 1999).
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2) (West 1999). Sexually violent predators are
required to register or update registration and must, on release from custody, check their
address at a minimum every 90 days. See id. § 290(a)(1)(D).
139. See People v. Franklin, 975 P.2d 30, 33 (Cal. 1999) ("[T]he registration act is
intended to promote the state's interest in controlling crime and preventing recidivism in
sex offenders by making them readily available for police surveillance at all times.");
Wright v. Superior Court, 936 P.2d 101, 105 (Cal. 1997) ("Plainly, the Legislature
perceives that sex offenders pose a continuing threat to society." (internal quotations
omitted)); People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 745 n.7 (Cal. 1993) ("The purpose of
section 290 is 'to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be
readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them
likely to commit similar offenses in the future."' (citing Barrows v. Municipal Court, 464
P.2d 483, 486 (Cal. 1970))).
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likelihood beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, given the known risk
factors whose cumulative presence presages reoffending,' 40 proof of that
likelihood is a question of fact to be explained and supported by expert
testimony.' 4' Any prediction, of course, has only a certain probability of
occurring. That is not a novel concept; in fact, that is the essential nature
of all empirical statements. Any statement, other than a tautology, is
subject to only a certain probability of truth. Of course, there are some
statements whose probability of truth have a very high estimate because
of the frequency of the subject matter's recurrence. ,4' By the same
token, the recidivism studies and expert testimony in this area provide
the empirical support for the fact that mental health experts can predict
the likelihood of reoffending and thus the dangerousness of a given
sexually violent predator.
H. THE CIVIL TRIAL
A. Pretrial Procedures
As stated, the Sexually Violent Predator Act is narrowly drawn to
focus on a small, legally and medically recognized class of "violent
criminal offenders who commit particular forms of predatory sex acts
against both adults and children"--the sexually violent predator. "' A
sexually violent predator, as stated earlier, is:
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or
more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and
140. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c) (West 1998). This section provides:
The standardized assessment protocol shall require assessment of diagnosable
mental disorders, as well as various factors known to be associated with the
risk of re-offense among sex offenders. Risk factors to be considered shall
include criminal and psychosexual history, type, degree, and duration of sexual
deviance, and severity of mental disorder.
Id.
141. See id. § 6604; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997); Hubbart v.
Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 590, 600 n.25 (Cal. 1999).
142. An example is, "The sun will rise in the morning."
143. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593 n.20. According to the California Supreme Court,
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, which was the subject of Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346 (1997), and California's Act track one another. Differences, if any, are purely
semantical. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 596. Both laws "base the commitment
determination, in part, on the commission of sexually violent predatory crimes." 1d. at
608 (emphasis added).
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safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent
criminal behavior. 44
The concern that the statute addresses is that a sexually violent predator,
because of his or her current diagnosed mental disorder, will likely,
without treatment, continue to prey on the unsuspecting public and will
continue to commit the type of offenses for which that person has been
convicted in the past.1
4 1
The procedures used to determine whether an individual is a sexually
violent predator are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that
determination. 46 The review begins with the tentative identification of a
sexually violent predator by the correctional agencies, progresses to an
evaluation of the person by mental health experts, and concludes with
judicial proceedings designed to test the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of an involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator. Each level of review focuses on different characteristics of a
sexually violent predator, uses different criteria, and thereby selectively
narrows the number of individuals to which the Act applies. 47 Initially,
144. Id. § 6600(a).
The Legislature has attempted to enlarge the category to include offenses wherein an
individual received an indeterminate term, or a finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity. See 1996 Cal. Stat. 462(4); Civil Commitment: Sexually Violent Predators,
Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure, AB 3130, Bill Analysis 3 (Cal. 1996) (as
amended July 7, 1996); Garcetti v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 586 (1999);
People v. West, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 556-58 (1999). That attempt will be discussed
later. See infra notes 214-24.
A diagnosed mental disorder includes "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of
criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety
of others." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c) (West 1998).
145. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593 n.20 (stating that the "SVPA is narrowly focused
on a select group of violent criminal offenders who commit particular forms of
predatory sex acts" and are "dangerous and likely to continue committing such crimes"
(emphasis added)). The statute does not explicitly state in its definition of a sexually
violent predator that a sexually violent predator will likely commit sexually violent
predatory offenses. But, as will be shown, that is what the Legislature intended.
146. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In Salerno, the issue was
the constitutionality of the 1984 Bail Reform Act that allowed a federal court to detain
certain arrestees pending trial. See id. at 741. The Court acknowledged that
"sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous
persons" and that the prevention of crime is a compelling government interest. Id. at
748-49. Because the SVPA focused on a particularly acute problem, and applied only to
a specific category of extremely serious offenses, and to individuals likely to be
responsible for dangerous acts, and because the detainees were provided with
constitutional safeguards such as the right to counsel, to testify, to present information,
and to cross-examine witnesses, the Court concluded that those procedures were
designed to further the accuracy of the determination of the likelihood of future
dangerousness. See id. at 750-5 1.
147. An example of the narrowing process afforded by these procedures is best
demonstrated by the statistics for involuntary commitment as of June 30, 1997. Initially,
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the preliminary identification consists of a paper review of the
individual's criminal history, proceeds to a mental health evaluation of
the person, and concludes with a trial at which the trier of fact must




Proceedings usually begin while the person is in custody, at least six
months prior to his release from custody. Based on the fact the
individual has committed a sexually violent predatory offense4 and thus
may be a sexually violent predator, he is referred for an evaluation.'5 °
Both the Department of Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms
screen the individual. 5' A review of the person's social, criminal, and
institutional history is conducted using a structured screening instrument
developed in conjunction with the Department of Mental Health.52 If, as
a result, "it is determined that the person is likely to be a sexually violent
1355 cases were referred to the Department of Mental Health as potential sexually
violent predators. Of that number, 467 received negative evaluations. The prosecuting
attorney rejected another 76 cases, and filed 263 petitions. Probable cause was not found
in 27 other cases, with the result that 34 individuals were committed as sexually violent
predators and 46 trials were still pending. Therefore, a total of 2.5% of the original
number were found to be sexually violent predators and committed; more than 65%, or
884 cases, were rejected; no decision had been reached in approximately one-third of the
cases. See Assembly Committee on Public Safety, SB 536, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1997)
(hearing date July 8, 1997).
148. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6601, 6602, 6603, 6604 (West 1998 & Supp.
2000).
149. According to the Act's definition of a sexually violent predator, the individual
must have been convicted of at least two sexually violent offenses, not one. See id. §
6600(a). Section 6601(b), which uses the singular phrase, "a sexually violent predator
offense," should be amended accordingly to require, as a minimum, two prior sexually
violent predatory offenses as a prerequisite for preliminary identification. Id. § 6601(b)
(emphasis added).
150. See id. § 6601(a)(1). This section provides:
Whenever the Director of Corrections determines that an individual who is in
custody under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and who is
either serving a determinate prison sentence or whose parole has been revoked,
may be a sexually violent predator, the director shall, at least six months prior
to that individual's scheduled date for release from prison, refer the person for
evaluation in accordance with this section. However, if the inmate was
received by the department with less than nine months of his or her sentence to
serve, or if the inmate's release date is modified by judicial or administrative
action, the director may refer the person for evaluation in accordance with this
section at a date that is less than six months prior to the inmate's scheduled
release date.
Id.
151. See id. § 6601(b).
152. See id.
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predator, the Department of Corrections shall refer the person to the
State Department of Mental Health for a full evaluation."'
At this point of the procedure, the process has narrowed the number of
potential sexually violent predators from those who "may be" to those
who are "likely to be" sexually violent predators. A review of the
individual's social, criminal, and institutional history reveals whether the
person has been convicted of any qualifying sexual offenses and whether
those offenses were predatory in nature."
Next, the Department of Mental Health evaluates the person.'55 Two
mental health experts must determine whether the individual meets the
other criteria in section 6600-whether he has a diagnosable mental
disorder'56 and whether, because of that, the person is likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody.'57
The standardized assessment protocol is used to determine the presence
of a mental disorder.'58 Risk factors known to be associated with the risk
of reoffending, such as the individual's "criminal and psychosexual
history, type, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of
153. Id. (emphasis added). This section provides:
The person shall be screened by the Department of Corrections and the Board
of Prison Terms based on whether the person has committed a sexually violent
predatory offense and on a review of the person's social, criminal, and
institutional history. This screening shall be conducted in accordance with a
structured screening instrument developed and updated by the State
Department of Mental Health in consultation with the Department of
Corrections.
Id.
154. "'Predatory' means an act is directed toward a stranger, a person of casual
acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with whom a
relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization."
Id. § 6600(e). The issue of whether the prior offenses must be predatory is currently
before the California Supreme Court and will be discussed infra at note 193.
155. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
156. See id. § 6601(c) (West Supp. 2000) ("'Diagnosed mental disorder' includes a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting
the person a menace to the health and safety of others.").
157. See id. § 6601(d). This section states:
Pursuant to subdivision (c), the person shall be evaluated by two practicing
psychiatrists or psychologists, or one practicing psychiatrist and one practicing
psychologist, designated by the Director of Mental Health. If both evaluators
concur that the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and
custody, the Director of Mental Health shall forward a request for a petition for
commitment under Section 6602 to the county designated in subdivision (i).
Copies of the evaluation reports and any other supporting documents shall be
made available to the attorney designated by the county pursuant to
subdivision (i) who may file a petition for commitment.
Id.
158. See id. § 6601(c).
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mental disorder," are used to determine whether the individual is a
danger to the health and safety of others.'59 Both assigned mental health
experts must agree that the person has a diagnosable mental disorder and
is sexually dangerous within the meaning of the Act.' 6
If one of the two mental health experts does not concur that the person
meets the criteria of a sexually violent predator, then two independent
professionals, with certain minimum requirements, are appointed to
perform further examinations.16' Both of these experts must agree that
the person meets the Act's criteria before a petition for commitment may
be requested. 62
159. Id. The section states in full:
The State Department of Mental Health shall evaluate the person in accordance
with a standardized assessment protocol, developed and updated by the State
Department of Mental Health, to determine whether the person is a sexually
violent predator as defined in this article. The standardized assessment
protocol shall require assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as well as
various factors known to be associated with the risk of reoffense among sex
offenders. Risk factors to be considered shall include criminal and
psychosexual history, type, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and
severity of mental disorder.
Id.
160. See id. § 6601(d).
161. See id. § 6601(e)-(g). The relevant portion of the Code provides:
(e) If one of the professionals performing the evaluation pursuant to
subdivision (d) does not concur that the person meets the criteria specified in
subdivision (d), but the other professional concludes that the person meets
those criteria, the Director of Mental Health shall arrange for further
examination of the person by two independent professionals selected in
accordance with subdivision (g).
(f) If an examination by independent professionals pursuant to
subdivision (e) is conducted, a petition to request commitment under this
article shall only be filed if both independent professionals who evaluate the
person pursuant to subdivision (e) concur that the person meets the criteria for
commitment specified in subdivision (d). The professionals selected to
evaluate the person pursuant to subdivision (g) shall inform the person that the
purpose of their examination is not treatment but to determine if the person
meets certain criteria to be involuntarily committed pursuant to this article. It
is not required that the person appreciate or understand that information.
(g) Any independent professional who is designated by the Director of
Corrections or the Director of Mental Health for purposes of this section shall
not be a state government employee, shall have at least five years of
experience in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, and shall
include psychiatrists and licensed psychologists who have a doctoral degree in
psychology. The requirements set forth in this section also shall apply to any
professionals appointed by the court to evaluate the person for purposes of any
other proceedings under this article.
Id.
162. See id. § 6601(f).
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In those cases where it is concluded that the person is a sexually
violent predator, then a request for a petition for commitment with the
evaluation reports and any other supporting documents are forwarded to
the county where the individual's last conviction occurred.'63 If the
government's counsel concurs with the recommendation, then "a
petition for commitment shall be filed" in the county's superior court.' 6
As shown, the statute has narrowed the number of targeted individuals
from those who were provisionally identified because of the nature of
their prior convictions, to those who are likely to be sexually violent
predators (because of the screening assessment), to an even smaller class
of those who, in addition, have a diagnosable mental disorder and are
likely to reoffend because of that condition.
Only after all of the discussed procedures have occurred does the third
level of review, judicial proceedings, begin. A probable cause hearing is
held in the superior court.' That hearing tests the sufficiency of the
evidentiary support for the petition's allegation that the named
individual is a sexually violent predator.'66 The probable cause review
serves as a preliminary check and evaluation of the propriety of the
proceedings.' 67 It requires evidence, established under the governing
burden of proof, to meet the objectives of the proceedings. In other
163. See id. §§ 6601(d), (h), (i), (1). Said subdivisions provide:
(h) If the State Department of Mental Health determines that the person
is a sexually violent predator as defined in this article, the Director of Mental
Health shall forward a request for a petition to be filed for commitment under
this article to the county designated in subdivision (i). Copies of the evaluation
reports and any other supporting documents shall be made available to the
attorney designated by the county pursuant to subdivision (i) who may file a
petition for commitment in the superior court.
(i) If the county's designated counsel concurs with the recommendation,
a petition for commitment shall be filed in the superior court of the county in
which the person was convicted of the offense for which he or she was
committed to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The petition
shall be filed, and the proceedings shall be handled, by either the district
attorney or the county counsel of that county. The county board of supervisors
shall designate either the district attorney or the county counsel to assume
responsibility for proceedings under this article.
(/) Pursuant to subdivision (d), the attorney designated by the county
pursuant to subdivision (i) shall notify the State Department of Mental Health
of its decision regarding the filing of a petition for commitment within 15 days
of making that decision.
Id. §§ 6601(h), (i), and (1).
164. Id. § 6601(i).
165. See id. § 6602.
166. See id. § 6602(a).
167. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (discussing the standard of
probable cause); People v. Elliot, 354 P.2d 225, 229 (Cal. 1960) (stating that the
preliminary cause hearing fulfills a necessary function of stopping unjustifiable
prosecution); Jaffe v. Stone, 114 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Cal. 1941) (discussing the purpose of
preliminary cause hearings).
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words, the evidence presented must lead an individual of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe or conservatively entertain a strong
suspicion that the targeted individual is a sexually violent predator and
that he is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory behavior upon
release.'68
At the probable cause hearing, several procedural safeguards are
afforded the individual. For example, "[t]he person named in the
petition shall be entitled to assistance of counsel,"'69 to the admission of
oral and written evidence, to cross-examine and confront witnesses, and
to call witnesses on his behalf, including expert witnesses. 0 In this
hearing, the individual may challenge the legal adequacy of the facts in
support of the petition.
17'
The standard to be used at the probable cause hearing is "whether
there is probable cause to believe that the individual named in the
petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal
behavior upon his or her release.' 7 2  If the superior court judge
168. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602(a); People v. Nagle, 153 P.2d 344, 347
(Cal. 1944); People v. Dickinson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563-64 (Ct. App. 1976); People v.
Malki, 5 Cal. Rptr. 207, 209 (Ct. App. 1960); People v. Jablon, 314 P.2d 824, 827 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957).
169. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602(a) (West Supp. 2000). This section
provides:
A judge of the superior court shall review the petition and shall determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual named in the
petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior
upon his or her release. The person named in the petition shall be entitled to
assistance of counsel at the probable cause hearing. If the judge determines
there is not probable cause, he or she shall dismiss the petition and any person
subject to parole shall report to parole. If the judge determines that there is
probable cause, the judge shall order that the person remain in custody in a
secure facility until a trial is completed and shall order that a trial be conducted
to determine whether the person is, by reason of a diagnosed mental disorder, a
danger to the health and safety of others in that the person is likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence upon his or her release from the jurisdiction of the
Department of Corrections or other secure facility.
Id.
170. See In re Parker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 178 (Ct. App. 1998); see also People v.
Butler, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1998) (agreeing with the Parker court that
the defendant may call and cross-examine experts).
171. See In re Parker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168. The procedures available at the
probable cause hearing are not specified in the statute. See id. The Parker court
correctly called upon either "the Supreme Court or the Legislature" to address this void
"by describing the specific procedures to ensure fairness for all [sexually violent
predator] cases." Id.
172. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602(a).
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determines that probable cause has not been established, the petition is
dismissed and, if subject to parole, the individual shall so report. On the
other hand, if the superior court judge determines that probable cause
has been established, the judge orders "that the person remain in custody
in a secure facility until a trial is completed."1 ' The court also orders
"that a trial be conducted to determine whether the person is, by reason
of a diagnosed mental disorder, a danger to the health and safety of
others, in that the person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence
upon his or her release."'7 4
Specific safeguards are also provided for those subject to a civil trial
under the Act. The individual is entitled to a court or a jury trial, the
assistance of counsel, the right to retain experts or professional persons
to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to have access to all
relevant medical and psychological records and reports.' If the person
cannot afford to hire counsel, one will be appointed, and if the person
requests assistance in obtaining expert or professional persons to
perform an examination, and participate in the trial on the person's
behalf, that assistance will be provided as well.76 At trial, a unanimous
verdict is required.' The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond
a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.' If this
burden is not met, the person is released.'79 However, if the court or jury
determines that the individual is a sexually violent predator, then the
person is committed for two years to the custody of the Department of
Mental Health for treatment and confinement.80
173. Id.; see id- § 6600.05(a) ("Until a permanent housing and treatment facility is
available, Atascadero State Hospital shall be used whenever a person is committed to a
secure facility .... ").
174. Id. § 6602(a).
175. See id. § 6603.
176. See id. This section provides:
(a) A person subject to this article shall be entitled to a trial by jury, the
assistance of counsel, the right to retain experts or professional persons to
perform an examination on his or her behalf, and have access to all relevant
medical and psychological records and reports. In the case of a person who is
indigent, the court shall appoint counsel to assist him or her, and, upon the
person's request, assist the person in obtaining an expert or professional person
to perform an examination or participate in the trial on the person's behalf.
(b) The attorney petitioning for commitment under this article shall have
the right to demand that the trial be before a jury.
(c) If no demand is made by the person subject to this article or the
petitioning attorney, the trial shall be before the court without jury.
Id. § 6603(a)-(c).
177. See id. § 6603(d) ( "A unanimous verdict shall be required in any jury trial.").
178. See id. § 6604.
179. See id.
180. See id. This section provides:
The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
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By requiring a unanimous jury verdict, and by using the reasonable
doubt standard, the Legislature has used constitutional procedures to
further the accuracy of the verdict and to narrow the application of the
Act. In California:
[o]ur Supreme Court has long held that such beyond a reasonable doubt burden
of proof is required in civil commitment proceedings because "the interests
involved in [such] proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal
person is a sexually violent predator. If the court or jury is not satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator, the
court shall direct that the person be released at the conclusion of the term for
which he or she was initially sentenced, or that the person be unconditionally
released at the end of parole, whichever is applicable. If the court or jury
determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be
committed for two years to the custody of the State Department of Mental
Health for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility
designated by the Director of Mental Health, and the person shall not be kept
in actual custody longer than two years unless a subsequent extended
commitment is obtained from the court incident to the filing of a new petition
for commitment under this article or unless the term of commitment changes
pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 6605. Time spent on conditional release
shall not count toward the two-year term of commitment, unless the person is
placed in a locked facility by the conditional release program, in which case
the time in a locked facility shall count toward the two-year term of
commitment. The facility shall be located on the grounds of an institution
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.
Id.
Once a person is committed, he undergoes treatment. See id. § 6606. This section
states:
(a) A person who is committed under this article shall be provided with
programming by-the State Department of Mental Health which shall afford the
person with treatment for his or her diagnosed mental disorder.
(b) Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any person
is a person described in Section 6600, nor is it required for treatment of that
person. Treatment does not mean that the treatment be successful or
potentially successful, nor does it mean that the person must recognize his or
her problem and willingly participate in the treatment program.
(c) The programming provided by the State Department of Mental Health
in facilities shall be consistent with current institutional standards for the
treatment of sex offenders, and shall be based on a structured treatment
protocol developed by the State Department of Mental Health. The protocol
shall describe the number and types of treatment components that are provided
in the program, and shall specify how assessment data will be used to
determine the course of treatment for each individual offender. The protocol
shall also specify measures that will be used to assess treatment progress and
changes with respect to the individual's risk of reoffense.
Id.
Further proceedings are provided under the Act for treatment and for review of the
individual's mental disorder; these proceeding are not pertinent to the civil trial and,
thus, will not be discussed in this Article. See id. §§ 6604.1- 6609.3.
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proceedings and that liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil
proceeding than when taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction."...
[For the same reasons, a person subject to such proceedings is entitled to a
unanimous verdict rather than the usual three-fourths agreement for a regular
civil verdict.' 81
There is always, in litigation, "a margin of error, representing error in
factfinding, which both parties must take into account."'82 In a criminal
case, in which one's life or liberty is at stake, these interests of the
defendant are of such magnitude, and the value society places on them
so great, that they are protected by a standard of proof designed to
exclude, as nearly as possible, the likelihood of an erroneous
judgment.' "This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process
Clause that the state prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' This standard of proof "allocates the risk of error" between
the two parties, the People and the accused;'85 it also places almost the
entire risk on the People.
Another function of this standard of proof in the realm of fact finding
"is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication.""86 This heavy standard manifests
society's concern that the risk to the individual must be minimized even
at the risk that some that are guilty might go free.'87 This requirement
reflects the view "that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free."'88 It is also meant to "impress the factfinder
with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the
chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered."'89  This
excludes as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.'
181. People v. Turner, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459,466 (2000) (quoting In re Gary W., 486
P.2d 1201, 1209 (Cal. 1971)) (alteration in original).
182. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
183. See id. at 525-26; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("In
cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a
minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty."' ) (quoting Tippett v.
Murel, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (alteration in original)); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363 (1970) ("The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this
vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance ... ").
184. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424; see In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
185. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
186. Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370).
187. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 ("In a criminal case, on the other hand, we
do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the
disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty."); see also Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (discussing In re Winship).
188. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372.
189. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
190. See id. at 424.
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The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of two types of
erroneous outcomes-convicting the innocent or letting the guilty go
free. "Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency
of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to
be applied... should.., reflect an assessment of the comparative social
disutility of each."' 9' In this context, the standard reflects the
fundamental value determination that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
B. Contentions to Be Proved
1. The Qualifying Prior Convictions
a. The Predatory Nature of the Prior Offenses Must Be Proved
One of the contentions subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that the individual named in the petition has suffered a minimum of two
prior convictions that involved at least two different victims, and which
were committed on, before, or after the effective date of the Act.'"
However, courts have disagreed whether the prosecution must also prove
that the prior convictions involved a predatory relationship between the
offender and the victim.'93 This problem arises because the Act refers to
the predatory nature of the prior offenses in only one section of the law,
and omits that qualifying adjective in all other references.'" Even
though this discrepancy exists, one of the most basic rules of statutory
construction is that "[a] statute must be construed in light of the
legislative purpose and design."' 95 "Both the legislative history of the
191. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
192. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)-(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
193. The California Supreme Court granted review to People v. Dacayana, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 121 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g granted, 996 P.2d 26 (Cal. 2000), People v. Torres,
84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g granted, 982 P.2d 153 (Cal. 1999), and
People v. Hurtado, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g granted, 986 P.2d 862
(Cal. 1999). The courts in Dacayana and Torres had concluded that the Legislature
intended the predatory nature of the prior offenses to be at issue at the evaluation stage
and the probable cause determination, but not at trial. See Dacayana, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
127; Torres, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105. The court in Hurtado disagreed, and held that the
predatory nature must be proved at trial. See Hurtado, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395-96.
194. See CAL. WLF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) ("The person shall be screened by the
Department of Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms based on whether the person
has committed a sexually violent predatory offense .... ") (emphasis added).
195. People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 499 (Cal. 1972); see People v. Coronado,
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statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment may be
considered in ascertaining the legislative intent."'96 The words used in a
statute, thus, "must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature
and obvious purpose of the statute."'97 Furthermore, the language of a
statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in
consequences which the Legislature did not intend and would frustrate
the legislative purpose.9 ' Finally, when a "word or phrase has been
given a particular... meaning in one part or portion of a law it shall be
given the same... meaning in other parts or portions of the law.""'
As shown above, the historical reason for the Act was to fill a specific
void in the law.2 °  Even though there were laws which required
registration of the most dangerous sexual criminals, sexually violent
predators, there were no laws which prevented the release of these
individuals into the community untreated, even though they were still
suffering from a disorder which causes them to continue to commit
violent sexual crimes and makes the individual a danger to the safety of
others. The Act was drafted to narrowly focus only on those individuals
identified as sexually violent predators. The Act restricts involuntary
civil commitment to those who have committed sexually violent
predatory offenses and who have the propensity, due to their mental
disorder, to continue to commit the same acts.20'
The Legislature concluded, based on information obtained by local
and federal correctional authorities, that the state needed "a civil
commitment procedure to allow the state a means to place and treat
sexually violent predators in a secure mental facility following their
release from prison."20 2
Clearly then, the Act applies only to this narrow group of offenders-
the sexually violent predator. Preliminary identification of those
individuals who may come within the confines of the Act begins with
the screening, the identification process that flags those individuals who
906 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Cal. 1995).
196. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 743 P.2d 1323, 1327
(Cal. 1987).
197. People v. Black, 648 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Cal. 1982).
198. See Coronado, 906 P.2d at 1234; Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d 193, 198 (Cal.
1967).
199. Stillwell v. State Bar, 173 P.2d 313, 315 (Cal. 1946).
200. See discussion supra Part II.
201. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 n.20 (Cal. 1999).
202. AB 888, Assembly Third Reading, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1995) (as amended May
31, 1995); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (West 1998) ("This part shall be
liberally construed so that, as far as possible and consistent with the rights of persons
subject to commitment, those persons shall be treated, not as criminals, but as sick
persons.").
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have committed prior sexually violent offenses of a predatory nature.0 3
Given the predator focus of the Act, it would be illogical to conclude
that the prior offenses used to identify one as a sexually -violent predator
need not be predatory in nature. In fact, the clear, express, unequivocal
language of one section of the Act requires just that.
2.
Furthermore, the Act explicitly provides for the manner in which the
predatory nature of the prior offenses may be proved to the trier of
fact.25 A specific hearsay exception is drafted into the Act which
permits the "details underlying the commission of an offense that led to
a prior conviction, including a predatory relationship... [to] be shown
by documentary evidence." 06 Jurors are permitted to consider that
evidence in reaching a verdict that a person is a sexually violent predator
if, and only if, there is also evidence that the defendant currently has a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes him sexually dangerous. °7 Unless
the prior offenses involved a sexually violent predatory crime, the prior
offenses would not be relevant to a finding that an individual is a
sexually violent predator. Evidence that an individual in the past has
committed that type of offense, taken into consideration with evidence
that the individual currently has a mental disorder which predisposes
him to commit that same type of criminal behavior, is strong
circumstantial evidence highly relevant for the trier of fact."' Prior
predatory offenses, current metal disorder, and future dangerous criminal
203. As noted, there is an internal inconsistency in the Act since the trier of fact
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual has committed a minimum of
two prior sexually violent offenses. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West
1998 & Supp. 2000). However, the language used in that part of the Act that deals with
the tentative identification of a sexually violent predator uses the singular phrase "a
sexually violent predatory offense." Id. § 6601(b) (emphasis added). This latter section
should be redrafted to correspond to section 6600(a).
204. See supra note 203.
205. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(a).
206. Id. § 6600(a). This language provides an exception to section 788 of the
Evidence Code, which makes inadmissible the facts of the prior conviction. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 788 (West 1995). In criminal trials, only the nature of the crime and the date and
place of the conviction may be admitted into evidence. See People v. Long, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 227, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Hall, 85 Cal. Rptr. 188, 194 (Ct. App.
1970).
207. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a). "[Plrior sexually violent offenses
are used solely for evidentiary purposes to help establish the main prerequisites upon
which civil commitment is based-current mental disorder and the likelihood of future
violent sex crimes." Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 608 (Cal. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted).
208. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 608.
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conduct, when present, are the three strands of the braid evidencing a
sexually violent predator.O9
Moreover, the Act mandates that the jurors be cautioned not to base
their finding that a person is a sexually violent predator solely on the fact
of his prior convictions.21 0  This caution-that the "[j]urors shall be
admonished that they may not find a person a sexually violent predator
based on prior offenses absent relevant evidence of a currently
diagnosed mental disorder"-would not be necessary unless the prior
offenses are predatory.211 What that caution means is that the trier of fact
is not to conclude that one is a sexually violent predator solely because
he was found guilty of predatory sexual offenses in the past.
Finally, the Legislative Counsel's Digest presentation to the Assembly
on February 22, 1995, included this statement of intent as to Assembly
Bill 888: "The bill would require the Department of Corrections and the
Board of Prison Terms to screen the person based on whether the
person has committed a sexually violent predatory offense .... ,,22
In fact, the italicized portion of the above statement of intent became
part of the Act.13 Clearly, this is what the Legislature intended; it is
what the Legislature meant, and furthermore, it is what the Legislature
said. The fact that the word "predatory" does not appear as a companion
term where each instance of "prior offense" is used is clearly a drafting
oversight. The alternative interpretation would lead to the absurd result
that a sexually violent predator is one who has committed non-predatory
crimes, and would thus be indistinguishable from any other sexually
violent offender.
Therefore, for all these reasons, one contention that must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt is that the person named in the petition had
suffered a minimum of two prior convictions for sexually violent
offenses as defined in the Act, which involved a minimum of two
victims and were predatory in nature.
209. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 593 n.20 ('The
SVPA is narrowly focused on a select group of violent criminal offenders who commit
particular forms of predatory sex acts... [and are] dangerous and likely to continue
committing such crimes if released into the community .... ). As the court in Hubbart
noted "the person's history of sexually violent crimes was used soley for evidentiary
purposes, either to demonstrate that a 'mental abnormality' exists or to support a finding
of future dangerousness." Id. at 606-07 (internal quotations omitted).
210. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a).
211. Id.
212. Sexually Violent Predators, AB 888, Legislative Counsel's Digest 1 (Cal.
1995) (filed with Sec. State Oct. 11, 1995) (emphasis added).
213. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) ('The person shall be screened by the
Department of Corrections and the Board of Prison Terms based on whether the person
has committed a sexually violent predatory offense....") (emphasis added).
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b. A Determinate Sentence Should Not Be Required
As originally drafted, the statute limited qualifying prior convictions
to those for which an individual had received a determinate sentence.2 4
But in hearings held in 1996, the Legislature discussed, and eventually
passed, legislation that amended that part of the law.2 5 The stated intent
was that the new version of subdivision (a) would clarify and expand the
definition of a sexually violent predator 16 to include those prior
convictions which had been sentenced under the Indeterminate
Sentencing Law ("ISL"), 27 had a finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity, or had a finding of a mentally disordered sex offender, and to
include out-of-state convictions for an offense that includes all the
elements of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of the Act.18
214. See id. § 6600(a).
215. See 1996 Cal. Stat. 462(4).
216. See Assembly Committee on Appropriations, AB 3130, Bill Analysis (Cal.
1996) (for hearing on May 22, 1996); Assembly Committee on Public Safety, AB 3130
Third Reading, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1996) (as amended May 24, 1996); Senate Committee
on Criminal Procedure, AB 3130, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1996) (as amended May 24, 1996,
for hearing June 18, 1996); Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure, AB 3130, Bill
Analysis (Cal. 1996) (as amended July 7, 1996, for hearing July 9, 1996); Senate Rules
Committee, AB 3130 Third Reading, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1996) (as amended July 15,
1996); Appropriations Committee Fiscal Summary, AB 3130, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1996)
(as amended July 15, 1996, for hearing Aug. 12, 1996); Senate Committee on Criminal
Procedure, SB 2161, Bill Analysis (Cal. 1996) (as amended August 28, 1996, for hearing
Aug. 31, 1996). AB 3130 is discussed herein and it is noted that the bill would expand
the definition of a SVP.
217. The original version of the Act would not apply to those who had been
sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West
1985). That law was enacted in 1917 and was in effect until July 1, 1977, when the
Determinate Sentencing Law ("DSL") took effect. See id. § 1170. The ISL did not
require the trial judge to set a fixed term but simply sentenced the individual to the term
prescribed by law. When the DSL took effect, those who had been sentenced under the
ISL were not resentenced under the DSL. Instead, the Community Release Board
determines the release date using the sentence that would have been imposed had the
person been sentenced under the DSL. See id. § 1168(a)-(c).
218. The Fifth District Court of Appeal did not directly address this issue, but stated
in dicta that the Legislature failed by its amendment to achieve its stated purpose. See
People v. West, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 557-58, 558 n.5 (Ct. App. 1999). The Third
District Court of Appeal held that a foreign conviction did not qualify as a prior offense
under the terms of the Act. See People v. Hunt, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 527-30 (Ct. App.
1999). The Sixth District Court of Appeal held that a literal reading of subdivision (b)
would preclude its application to prior convictions of Penal Code § 261(3). See People
v. Butler, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 368 (Ct. App. 1998). Because such offenders who
commit that crime come within the intent of the Act's coverage, the court refused to
adopt that construction of the statute since it would lead to absurd consequences. See id.
Recently, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a prior conviction of a sexual
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The current version of subdivision (a), as amended, now provides:
(a) "Sexually violent predator" means a person who has been convicted of
a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she
received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that
makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely
that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.
For purposes of this subdivision, a prior finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity for an offense described in subdivision (b), a conviction prior to July 1,
1977, for an offense described in subdivision (b), a conviction resulting in a
finding that the person was a mentally disordered sex offender, or a conviction
in another state for an offense that includes all the elements of an offense
described in subdivision (b), shall also be deemed to be a sexually violent
offense even if the offender did not receive a determinate sentence for that prior
offense.
219
The second paragraph was added as a result of the new legislation. As
previously stated, that paragraph was intended to enlarge the definition
of a sexually violent predator, but a literal reading of the statute reveals
that it fails in that regard.22' The actual effect of the passage is to define
the phrase "sexually violent offenses" to include those in which the
person was sentenced under the ISL, found not guilty by reason of
insanity, or found to be a mentally disordered sex offender, as well as
out-of-state convictions for an offense which includes all of the elements
of an offense described in subdivision (b). However, subdivision (b)
already included those offenses, so the amendment, if interpreted
literally, did not change the law in the manner intended. A sexually
violent predator is still one whom, inter alia, was sentenced under the
Determinate Sentencing Law ("DSL") for his or her prior sexually
violent offenses.
Thus, the question arises whether to interpret the law literally, which
would frustrate the stated intent, or ignore the literal meaning of the
amendment and interpret it in accordance with what the Legislature
intended. To answer that question, the legislative history of the
amendment must be reviewed, since one of the most basic rules of
statutory construction is that a statute should not be interpreted to
frustrate a change in the law, but rather "to ascertain and effectuate [that]
legislative intent."22'
Fortunately, the history of Assembly Bill 3130 provides numerous
statements of what the Legislature was trying to achieve with this
amendment. A bill analysis provided for the Assembly Committee on
offense may be a qualifying offense under the Act even if the defendant was sentenced to
an indeterminate term. See Garcetti v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 583, 587
(Ct. App. 1999).
219. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West 1998).
220. See supra notes 216-19.
221. People v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154, 156 (Cal. 1987).
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Public Safety for the hearing on April 23, 1996, included the statement
that the bill "[m]odifies the definition of a 'sexually violent predator"' to
include those "found not guilty by reason of insanity in this state... or
in another jurisdiction which includes all the elements of any sexually
violent offense .... 2,,m According to this analysis, the purpose of the
modification was to clarify the law and enlarge the definition of a
sexually violent predator.'
"[A]nalysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent."124
In fact, in addition to statements of intent, "a material change in the
language of a legislative enactment is ordinarily viewed as showing an
intent on the part of the Legislature to change the meaning of the
statute."' ' 5 In this case, the legislative history confirms that fact.
Therefore, the statute must be construed in light of that legislative
purpose and design.2 6 In fact, as noted by the California Supreme Court,
"the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration."'
Furthermore, the "language of a statute should not be given a literal
meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the
Legislature did not intend.,,22 "The intent prevails over the letter [of the
law], and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit
of the act., 29 When "uncertainty exists consideration should be given to
the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." 230
Additionally, courts "may resort to extrinsic sources" to help in this
analysis, such as the "objects to be achieved and the legislative
222. Assembly Committee on Public Safety, AB 3130, Bill Analysis, at 1 (Cal.
1996) (hearing date Apr. 23, 1996).
223. See id.; Contrary to the Court of Appeal's statement in West, that "[nlothing in
the 1996 amendment states that it is intended to clarify existing law," the history of
Assembly Bill 3130 relates just that. West, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557. In fact, the Court of
Appeal, in People v. Butler, reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the amendment
was to clarify the law rather than simply to enlarge its application. See Butler, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 370.
224. Woodhead, 741 P.2d at 157.
225. Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. Long Beach, 759 P.2d 504, 509 (Cal.
1988).
226. See People v. Coronado, 906 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Cal. 1995); Woodhead, 741
P.2d at 156; People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481,489 (Cal. 1972).
227. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744,754 (Cal. 1985).
228. Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d 193, 198 (Cal. 1967); see Coronado, 906 P.2d at
1234.
229. Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988).




Not only must statutory construction "effectuate the law's purpose,"
but it must also analyze the provisions so as to harmonize them with the
diverse sections of the statute so as not to lead to absurd results.2 2 In
fact, courts are constrained to select that construction "that comports
most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.' ' 3
Finally, one of the most basic rules of statutory construction is that
courts should avoid an interpretation that renders part of the statute
surplusage.'
With these rules in mind, if the meaning of the amendment is taken
literally, the result is that there is no change in the law. In other words,
even though the Legislature intended to amend, clarify, and expand the
definition of a sexually violent predator, the result is that the law
remains unchanged. Obviously, this result violates a number of the rules
of statutory construction set forth above: it frustrates the intent of the
Legislature, it results in an amendment to the law which makes no
changes to the law, it fails to expand the definition of a sexually violent
predator, and it results in the absurd consequence that the amendment
did not amend the law.
A literal analysis would also promote the internal inconsistency that
was inherent in that part of the law with respect to the qualifying
convictions. Subdivision (b) permits the introduction into evidence of
any prior conviction of a sexually violent offense whether committed on,
before, or after the date of the Act. As noted, the Act became operative
on January 1, 1996." The explicit language of subdivision (b) permits
evidence of convictions that predate 1996, as evidence of an individual's
status as a sexually violent predator.26 The indeterminate sentencing law
was in effect until July 1, 1977.27 The result is that prior convictions
would be admissible under subdivision (b), but would be inadmissible
under subdivision (a) of the Act. Thus, a literal interpretation of the
amendment would perpetuate this inconsistency inherent in the Act, and
231. Coronado, 906 P.2d at 1234; see Granberry v. Islay Invs., 889 P.2d 970, 973
(Cal. 1995).
232. People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Cal. 1986); see People v. Simon,
886 P.2d 1271, 1285 (Cal. 1995).
233. Coronado, 906 P.2d at 1234 (quoting People v. Jenkins, 893 P.2d 1224, 1231
(Cal. 1995)).
234. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 864 (Cal. 1988); People v.
Gilbert, 462 P.2d 850, 864 (Cal. 1969).
235. See 1995 Cal. Stat. 763, § 3; Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 586-87
(Cal. 1999).
236. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (West 1998).
237. See 1976 Cal. Stat. 1139.
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would violate another rule of statutory construction, which requires that
the section in question be "construed with reference to the entire
system.., of which it is a part," so as to harmonize the diverse
sections.28
Another reason that a literal interpretation of the amendment should
be eschewed is that all those individuals who received a disposition
other than a determinate sentence would be exempted from the Act's
application. This interpretation would render a large number of the most
violent and dangerous sexual offenders free to be returned to community
life untreated, even though they are a current danger to others. '9 A
result of this sort defeats not only the intent of the amendment, but also
the Act itself, presenting a very persuasive reason not to adopt a literal
interpretation of the amendment.m
The Act does not limit the age of a prior conviction. Presumptively,
there would be many instances of prior convictions where the defendant
was sentenced under the ISL. Given the fact that the Legislature did
have this information before it during its discussions about the Act, an
expansive reading of the amendment should be favored by the courts to
achieve consistency with the Act's provisions' This would be
consistent with the rule that when there are two possible constructions of
the law, that which leads to the more reasonable result should be
adopted.242
Finally, one last point must be made. It is a well-known rule of law
that "cases are not authority for propositions not considered."2 43 The
California Supreme Court in Hubbart v. Superior Court was concerned
only with the issue of whether the Act was constitutional.244 The court
did not indulge in statutory construction. Thus, any such statements
interpreting the Act are only dicta. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
the court did read and describe the added paragraph to subdivision (a), as
an amendment, and further stated that:
238. People v. Simon, 886 P.2d 1271, 1285 (Cal. 1995).
239. See People v. Butler, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 368 (Cal. App. 1998).
240. See id. at 369-70 (holding that the Act applied even though the individual
named in the petition had prior convictions which did not exactly meet the requirements
of subdivision (b) of section 6600).
241. See Simon, 886 P.2d at 1285.
242. See id. at 1287.
243. People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 359 (Cal. 1975) ("In the federal system no
less than in California, cases are not authority for propositions not considered.").
244. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 592-93 (Cal. 1999).
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As originally enacted, section 6600, subdivision (a) referred only to persons
who had "received a determinate sentence" for any qualifying prior conviction.
However, this section has since been amended to also apply in cases where the
prior conviction did not result in a determinate sentence, and where a prior
sexually violent offense charge resulted in a finding of not guilty by reason of
insanity. 14 5
This interpretation of the amendment is repeated in Hubbart a second
time. 46 If anything, these passages show that the reading suggested
herein is a viable interpretation of the amendment.
In a recent decision, Division Four of the Second Appellate District
concluded that the Act did apply to qualifying convictions sentenced
under the ISL.247 The court in Garcetti v. Superior Court characterized
the amendment as one of substance. Even though a literal meaning of
the amendment only affected the definition of a sexually violent offense,
the court found several persuasive reasons not to interpret the
amendment in this way.24 First, the amendment, by its own terms,
applies to subdivision (a), the definition of a sexually violent predator,
and not to subdivision (b), the definition of a sexually violent offense.249
Second, the amendment explicitly applies to convictions suffered prior
to July 1, 1977, the operative date of the DSL.20  Finally, this
interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Act and the legislative
history of the amendment, and it prevents part of the amendment from
being surplusage."'
Nevertheless, even though courts should be constrained to adopt this
view of the law for purposes of clarity, the Legislature should change the
language of the amendment. Deleting the phrase, "for which he or she
received a determinate sentence" from the definition of a sexually
violent predator would achieve the desired effect. 12 Alternatively,
section 6600, subdivision (a), of the California Welfare and Institutions
Code should be amended as follows:23
(a)(1) "Sexually violent predator" means a person who has been convicted
of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she
received a determinate sentence, or other disposition, and who has a diagnosed
mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others
in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal
behavior.24
245. Id. at 588 n.7.
246. See id. 608 n.34.
247. See Garcetti v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1999).
248. See id. at 585-86.
249. See id. at 585.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 585-86.
252. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West 1998).
253. For ease of the reader, the additions are italicized.
254. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (emphasis added). Further changes have
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(2) For purposes of subdivision (a)(1), "other disposition" means a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity, afinding of mentally disordered sex offender,
a sentence under the Indeterminate Sentencing Law, or a conviction in another
state for an offense that includes all of the elements qf an offense described in
subdivision (b).2
5
Either amendment would clarify the statute, provide guidance to trial
courts, and eliminate further proceedings on this issue.
2. The Diagnosed Mental Disorder and the Likelihood of Reoffending
The last two components of the definition which must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) the person named in the petition has
a diagnosed mental disorder, and (2) the mental disorder makes the
person dangerous to others in that it is likely he or she will engage in
sexually violent criminal behavior2 6 A diagnosed mental disorder is
defined to include "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a
menace to the health and safety of others.''"
Exactly how the person's mental disorder is related to the individual's
sexual criminal behavior is not explained in the statute. Clearly, there is
a causal relationship. But the exact nature of that causal relationship is
to be made to this definition and will be addressed infra.
255. The remaining portion of subdivision (a) should be renumbered (a)(3). See
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a).
256. See id. § 6600(c). For examples of diagnosed mental disorders in cases which
involve the Sexually Violent Predator Act, see generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 354 (1997) (dealing with pedophilia); Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 592
(Cal. 1999) ("[D]iagnosis of... Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, Bondage, Rape and
Sodomy of Adult Women, Severe"); People v. Chambless, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444, 448 n.8
(Ct. App. 1999) (discussing defendant diagnosed with transvestism, antisocial
personality disorder, and amphetamine abuse); People v. Poe, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 439
(Ct. App. 1999) (discussing defendant's diagnosis with "two mental disorders:
polysubstance dependence and antisocial personality disorder"); People v. Ward, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 828, 831 (Ct. App. 1999) (discussing defendant's diagnoses with paraphilia,
learning disorders, depression, and antisocial personality, among other mental disorders);
People v. Mercer, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 1998) (personality disorder with
schizoid features and pedophilia); People v. Butler, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357, 362 (Ct. App.
1998) (discussing defendant with alcohol related disorder, assaultive tendencies toward
females, polysubstance and alcohol dependence, dysthmic disorder, and a personality
disorder). Almost any diagnosis that includes a mental disorder "could be used to
qualify offenders for commitment." Saul J. Faerstein, Sexually Dangerous Predators
and Post-Prison Commitment Laws, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 895, 899-900 (1998).
257. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c).
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unclear."3 It is submitted that the individual's criminal act is a result of
his conscious choice and his wrongful intent, and moreover, is a result of
the individual's free will. The criminal act is a deliberate act, the nature
of which is delineated by the nature of the mental disease, as will be
shown.2
9
In both Kansas v. Hendricks26° and Hubbart v. Superior Court,6' the
courts used various phrases to describe the relationship between the
disorder and the criminal act, such as: "a diagnosed mental disorder
which prevents him from controlling sexually violent behavior";262 a
"present inability to control sexually violent behavior";263 "a currently
diagnosed mental disorder characterized by an inability to control
dangerous sexual behavior" ;264 a "'personality disorder' that makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous
behavior";265 "a [diagnosed] volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control";266 a mental disorder that "'makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence'; 267 and
"'current' mental disorder which significantly impairs the ability to
control sexually violent behavior."261 These descriptive phrases are not
synonymous in meaning. Some of the phrases, such as "an inability to
control" and "beyond their control" indicate behavior where choice is
absent. Yet other phrases, such as "likely to engage in" or "impairs the
ability" are consistent with behavior that reflects a deliberate choice on
the part of the actor. Because these phrases have such diverse meanings
258. For example, is the criminal act one that the individual committed because of
an irresistible impulse, which is uncontrollable yet does not affect his reasoning abilities?
See People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492, 498-99 (Cal. 1959). Or, is the criminal act one
where choice is absent and the individual could not do otherwise? See People v.
Buffington, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,702 (Ct. App. 1999).
259. This meaning is consonant with the philosophical assumption implicit in
criminal law that man has a free will and is responsible for his acts. See Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975);
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952). A detailed discussion on that
subject is beyond the scope of this Article. However, see Joan Comparet-Cassani, How
the Abolition of Diminished Capacity Affected Parity of Sentencing in Murder Cases
Under the California Determinate Sentencing Law, 29 Sw. U. L. REv. 51 (1999) for a
more complete discussion.
260. 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
261. 969 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1999). The court in Hubbart acknowledged that the
differences between the two Acts with respect to the mental disorder were only
semantical. Id. at 596.
262. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
265. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994)
(emphasis added)).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 357 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994) (emphasis added)).
268. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 604 (emphasis added).
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and because neither court was addressing this issue when those
descriptive phrases were used, to read too much into the use by the
courts would be a mistake.269
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the relationship between the disorder
and the criminal act is one bereft of choice. One reason for this
conclusion is the choice of language the Legislature used in the
definition of a sexually violent predator. That definition requires only
that the disorder render the individual likely to commit such crimes.270
This characterization implies that there is only a probability or a
likelihood that the offense will occur. If the individual could not do
other than commit such acts, the Legislature would have defined a
sexually violent predator as "one... who has a mental disorder that
makes a person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it
compels the person to engage in sexually violent behavior."
Another reason is that the Legislature included in the definition of the
diagnosed mental disorder the phrase "volitional capacity.' 27' According
to the definition, the mental disorder is a condition, which affects,
among other things, the person's volitional capacity. 72  Volitional
capacity refers to the act of choosing, willing, or deciding on a course of
action, or an exercise of one's will.273 As phrased, the condition affects
the person's ability to choose which criminal acts to commit and
suggests that it "predisposes 274 him to commit certain types of acts.
Again, the use of the term "predisposes" indicates activity that has a
certain likelihood of occurring, not activity that will inevitably occur.
Finally, the last reason that favors this interpretation is the nature of
the crimes committed. It is common knowledge that sex crimes are
committed in secret.2 5 Rapes, sexual assaults, and child molestations
rarely occur in public places in view of potential witnesses, other than
269. See People v. Buffington, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 702 (1999), in which the Third
District Court of Appeal does rely on those characterizations to conclude that the
"mental condition that renders [a sexually violent predator] dangerous beyond his
control" is "[t]he key consideration." Id.
270. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000)
271. Id. § 6600(c).
272. See id.
273. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2562
col.3 (1993).
274. Predispose means to make susceptible or to incline. See id. at 1786 col. 2.
275. See People v. Falsetta, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847 (Cal. 1999); People v. Fitch, 63
Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (Ct. App. 1997).
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co-conspirators. 276 Rather, such crimes are performed when third parties
are not present, because the actor is aware of the act's criminal nature.
The actor does not want to be discovered, stopped, or caught, or to have
others present who could testify as to what happened. That is why such
trials are usually credibility contests; they generally involve two
conflicting versions of what occurred-that of the victim and that of the
defendant. For the same reason, it follows that the actor does possess
control over his disorder. The time, place, manner, and commission of
the crime must be planned and plotted in order to avoid detection.
Whatever causal relationship exists between the disorder and the
criminal act, it is one that is subject to the actor's control and to choice.
What is not explicit in the definition of a sexually violent predator, nor
in any of the other definitions in the statute, is that the State must also
prove, and the trier of fact must find, that the danger posed by a sexually
violent predator is that they are likely to engage in predatory sexually
violent criminal behavior.27   That term is conspicuously, and
surprisingly, absent in the definition of a sexually violent predator and in
the definition of mental disorder. 27' The only reasonable explanation is
that the omission is an unintentional oversight. The alternative, that a
sexually violent predator is one who is dangerous but does not commit
sexually violent criminal predatory acts, is inherently inconsistent and
simply unacceptable.
Thus, the prosecutor should be required to prove that the individual
has a currently diagnosed mental disorder, which makes the person
dangerous because it is likely the individual will engage in predatory
sexually violent criminal acts, and the definition of the diagnosed mental
disorder should include that it predisposes that person to commit
predatory sexually violent criminal acts.29 The reasons for adopting this
interpretation are numerous.
First, the most obvious reason to interpret the law in this way is that
the Act applies to sexual predators. What precipitated its enactment, as
already demonstrated, was the fact that sexually violent predators are the
most dangerous of the violent criminals and the ones most likely to
reoffend.
Second, courts agree that the "[p]rior qualifying sex crimes are used as
276. See Falsetta, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847.
277. This issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in People
v. Hurtado, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 1999), reh'g granted, 986 P.2d 862 (Cal.
1999). The court in Hurtado held that the predatory nature must be proved at trial. See
Hurtado, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395-96. See also discussion supra note 177.
278. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. § 6600(a), (c). The term predator does appear
in sections 6600(0, 6601(b), 6601.5, 6602(a), 6602.5(a), and 6607(a) of the Act.
279. It is recommended the Legislature amend subdivisions (a) and (c) accordingly.
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evidence" of both the person's mental disorder and dangerousness.20 It
comports with common sense to conclude that someone whose
diagnosed mental disorder was sufficient to cause him to commit a
sexually violent predatory act in the past, and currently still has the same
disorder, is likely to commit such acts in the future. It is also reasonable
to conclude that the nature of the sex act committed in the past is due to
the mental disorder. Thus, given the current existence of the same
mental disorder, the same types of criminal conduct are likely to occur,
including the predatory nature of the relationship between the potential
victim and the actor. Prior offenses provide circumstantial evidence of
that person's mental disorder because they are manifestations of it.2' As
shown earlier, the qualifying priors must involve a predatory
relationship between the offender and the victim. That same relationship
then must exist in any possible future crime or else the prior conviction
would not be relevant evidence with respect to the defendant's mental
condition and future dangerousness. Prior crimes also provide
circumstantial evidence of the individual's dangerousness because of the
causal link between the mental disorder and the likelihood of future
criminal acts.22 In fact, the concern that sexually violent predators are
individuals who repeat the same crimes "is echoed throughout the
statutory scheme."' Indeed, the risk factors used to evaluate potential
280. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 599 (Cal. 1999); see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
281. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358; id. at 362 ("[E]vidence of the prior criminal
conduct was received.., to show the accused's mental condition and to predict future
behavior.") (internal quotations omitted)); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 596 ("[P]ast criminal
conduct served an important evidentiary function in establishing the dangerous mental
impairments of [a SVP]."); id. at 599 ("Prior qualifying sex crimes are used as evidence
in determining whether the person named in the petition is a SVP beyond a reasonable
doubt."); id. at 606-07 ("Instead, the person's history of sexually violent crimes was used
solely for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a mental abnormality exists or
to support a finding of future dangerousness." (internal quotations omitted)); id. at 608
("[P]rior sexually violent offenses are used 'solely for evidentiary purposes' to help
establish the main prerequisites upon which the civil commitment is based-current
mental disorder and the likelihood of future violent sex crimes." (quoting Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 362)).
282. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 604 ("[T]he qualifying mental disorder gives rise to the
likelihood of more crimes and makes the person dangerous if released into the
community.").
283. Id. at 600 n.25 ("This concern over sexually violent offenders who are likely to
repeat their crimes is echoed throughout the statutory scheme."); see id. at 601 ("[T]he
evidentiary methods contemplated by the Act are sufficiently reliable and accurate to
accomplish its narrow and important purpose-confining and treating mentally
disordered individuals who have demonstrated their inability to control specific sexually
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sexually violent predators are those associated with recidivism.2
Third, as shown in Part II, the historical antecedents for the Act were
the three federal Acts, the Jacob Wetterling Act, the Pam Lyncher Act,
and Megan's Law. Both the Jacob Wetterling Act and the Lyncher Act
define a sexually violent predator to mean "a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to
engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. ''n Although not
determinative, when state law is based on federal legislation, it is
appropriate to look to federal law when statutory construction is
required.286 Because a sexually violent predator is defined in the federal
statutes as one who commits sexually violent predatory acts, and state
law was promulgated in response to, and based on, the federal law, it is
persuasive evidence that the State Legislature intended that the term
sexually violent predator have the same meaning.
Additionally, the California Supreme Court in Hubbart acknowledged
that the Kansas SVPA, under scrutiny in Hendricks, was almost identical
to the California Act.27  But one important difference between the two
Acts is the definition of a sexually violent predator. The Kansas Act
defines a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been
convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence." '
Furthermore, unlike its California counterpart, the Kansas act requires
the trier of fact to find that the individual is likely to commit predatory
sexually violent acts. 9 Finally, the preamble to the Kansas act includes
comments not found in California's statutory statement, namely, that this
"small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators...
[are] likely to engage in... repeat acts of predatory sexual violence."2'
Since both acts were drafted in response to the same problem, and deal
with the same type of criminal offenders, and the California Supreme
Court based its analysis in Hubbart on that of the Court in Hendricks, it
is persuasive that the California drafters' omission of the term
violent behavior through the commission of similar prior crimes." (emphasis added)).
284. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 600 n.25.
285. 42 U.S.C. §14071(a)(3) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 14072(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998)
("IT]he term[] ... 'sexually violent predator' ... [has] the same meanings as in section
14071(a)(3) .... "). Megan's Law does not define the term.
286. See generally People v. Bolin, 956 P.2d 374, 402-04 (Cal. 1998) (analyzing
state law by reviewing federal decisions).
287. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
288. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
289. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01.
290. Id.
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"predatory" was not deliberate.
Yet another important consideration weighs in favor of this
interpretation:
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to
care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.291
Due process"' concerns rise to the fore when forcible civil detainment
of an individual is provided for by statute. There are two aspects to due
process under the law: procedural due process and substantive due
process.293  Procedural due process concerns the guarantee of fair
procedures, including the right to counsel, or the right to appointed
counsel if one is indigent, the right to confrontation, the right to be
heard, and the right to notification.29 Substantive due process is
"broadly defined as the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his... liberty," nor subject to "arbitrary and
unreasonable government action."295  "[C]ivil commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection."296 "[F]reedom from physical restraint 'has always
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process clause from
291. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979).
292. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part, "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment further provides, in
part, that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The
California Constitution, in section 7, subdivision (a) of Article I, also provides, "A
person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Due process of law means
such an exercise of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law
permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in
question belongs.... Due process of law implies the right of the person
affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment
upon the question of life, liberty, or property, in its most comprehensive sense;
to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting,
by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter
involved.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (5th ed. 1979).
293. See id.
294. See id. at 1083.
295. Id. at 1281.
296. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
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arbitrary governmental action."' 297  But even that constitutionally
protected interest may be overridden in the civil context in certain
narrow circumstances. Preventing danger to the community is one such
circumstance.Y An individual's right to liberty gives way to the greater
good of society where the government's interest is sufficiently
weighty.2" Restricting the freedom of an individual, who is a danger to
others, "is a legitimate nonpunitive... objective" that a state may
undertake.3 While recognizing, on the one hand, that a state has the
right to restrict the freedom of those considered a danger to the safety of
others, both the legislatures and the courts acknowledge, on the other
hand, that such restrictions must comply with specific evidentiary
requirements."'
One limitation that has been imposed is that the class of individuals
subject to forcible confinement be narrowly drawn,'°2 thereby protecting
the individual from overreaching by the government.3 A second
limitation is that the "nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed."3 4  A third requirement is that the scope of the law's
application is pursuant to enumerated evidentiary standards, thereby
protecting against arbitrary government action.05
297. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
298. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
299. See id. at 751.
300. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.
301. See id. at 364; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741; Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 362 (1983); Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
302. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357 ("Accordingly, states have in certain narrow
circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to
control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety."
(emphasis added)); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (1992) ("We have also held that in certain
narrow circumstances persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may be
subject to limited confinement .... ); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 ("The Bail Reform Act
carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most
serious of crimes." (emphasis added)).
303. See generally Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 ("These added statutory
requirements [dangerousness and a mental abnormality] serve to limit involuntary civil
confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous
beyond their control." (emphasis added)); id. ("The pre-commitment requirement of a
'mental abnormality' or 'personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of
these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for
confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness." (emphasis
added)); id. at 364 ('The numerous procedural and evidentiary protections afforded here
demonstrate that the Kansas Legislature has taken great care to confine only a narrow
class of particularly dangerous individuals .... " (emphasis added)).
304. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); see Addington, 441 U.S. at 425
(1979) ("[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection.").
305. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81.
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As shown, the Act has an inherent narrowing function, which begins
with a tentative identification of an individual as a sexually violent
predator based on prior predatory offenses.3 At the next stage, the
analysis by mental health experts further limits the application of the Act
to a smaller number of individuals, those who have a diagnosed mental
disorder."' The probable cause hearing tests the evidentiary basis of the
petition for commitment, and thereby binds for trial only those
individuals who the court has found probable cause to believe are likely
to engage in "sexually violent predatory criminal behavior."33 Finally,
at trial, the trier of fact must find that the State has proved "beyond a
reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."3°9 The Act
is theoretically limited and narrowed to a small number of individuals by
a finding of current dangerousness to others, a conviction of designated
prior predatory sex offenses, or a currently diagnosed medical disorder
of a type that disposes the individual to repeat the sexually violent
predatory conduct.10
However, if the standard to be used for this latter finding is that there
is a "likelihood the individual will engage in sexually violent criminal
behavior," then the Act's narrowing function has essentially been
eviscerated. This standard is broader and looser than the one used for a
probable cause determination, and necessarily would permit a larger
number of individuals to be involuntarily committed than a standard
which required a likelihood of the commission of a sexually violent
predatory act. It would also nullify the safeguards sewn into the fabric
of the Act since the narrowing process outlined above would be
eliminated by the use of this more general standard, in violation of due
process protection.'
Moreover, Hubbart acknowledged that the "narrow and important
purpose" of the Act is to confine and treat sexually violent predators
until they are no longer a danger. '12 Hubbart also acknowledges that
306. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
307. See id. § 6601(d).
308. Id. § 6601.5; see id. § 6602.
309. Id. § 6604.
310. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 597 (Cal. 1999).
311. Additionally, placement in a state hospital while awaiting trial requires a
probable cause finding that the person is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory
criminal behavior. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602.5(a) (West Supp. 2000).
Conditional release into the community is based on a finding that the individual is not
likely to commit acts of predatory sexual violence. See id. § 6608(d).
312. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 601. The initial commitment is for a two-year period.
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commitment, in part, is based on the "commission of sexually violent
predatory crimes."3 '3 If commitment instead is based on the likelihood
of engaging in sexually violent criminal behavior, that standard would
not have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the commitment, and
would thus violate due process.
Finally, the purpose of commitment is to treat sexually violent
predators."' 4 Confinement of a sexually violent predator is linked to the
stated purpose of commitment, which is to hold that individual until his
mental disorder no longer causes him to be a threat to others."'
Treatment for sexually violent predators is different than for those
individuals committed under other civil commitment statutes.316 In fact,
sexually violent predators are not amenable to existing mental illness
treatment modalities."7 The Act is based, in part, on the premise that a
sexually violent predator's mental disorder is not a proper basis for
commitment under other mental health schemes and requires specific
care and treatment devised specifically for their disorders.3"8 The Act
mandates the Department of Mental Health develop such treatment,
which must be individual for each person's specific disorder.3 9 Thus, if
one is committed for reasons other than the likelihood of committing
sexually violent predatory acts, then the treatment provided under the
Act would be at variance with that individual's disorder since that
person's mental disorder would not be related to predatory acts of sexual
violence. Once again, the result is that the purpose of commitment
would not bear a reasonable relation to the nature of the commission, in
direct violation of due process.
Thus, for all these reasons, the conclusion is inescapable that the trier
of fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is likely
to commit sexually violent predatory acts. Without doubt, that is the
burden the state must shoulder in order to mandate commitment and the
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604.
313. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 601.
314. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606 ("A person who is committed under this
article shall be provided... with treatment for his or her diagnosed mental disorder.");
Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 601.
315. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6605, 6607, 6608.
316. Compare id. §§ 6500-6513 with Lanterman-Petris Short Act, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 5150, 5250, 5300 (West 1998), and Disposition of Mentally Disordered
Prisoners Upon Discharge, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960-2981 (West 2000).
317. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 587 ("Through the passage of the SVPA, California
is one of several states to hospitalize or otherwise attempt to treat troubled sexual
predators apart from any criminal sanctions they might receive, and apart from civil
commitment schemes targeting other mental health problems.").
318. See id. at 603 ("The Act is based on the premise that SVP's suffer from
clinically diagnosable mental disorders which require psychiatric care and treatment, and
which are not a proper basis for commitment under other mental health schemes.").
319. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606.
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Act should be so interpreted.3 20
3. Application of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination to the Proceedings
a. Introduction
Proceedings under the Act are civil 21 But because individuals subject
to commitment under the Act have some rights afforded a criminal
defendant, the question arises whether they also have the same rights
under the Fifth Amendment as a criminal defendant.32 The short answer
is no, but with caveats, clarifications, and explanations.
There are two separate and distinct privileges provided by the Fifth
Amendment. First, the Fifth Amendment grants a defendant at his
criminal trial the absolute right not to be called as a witness and the right
not to testify.3z2 Second, any witness in any proceeding, whether civil or
criminal, formal or informal, has the right to refuse to answer questions
where the answers might incriminate that person in future criminal
proceedings. 24
Historically, the purpose for the privilege against self-incrimination is
to ensure that our criminal justice system remains accusatorial, not
inquisitorial.3" In other words, convictions must be obtained by
government securing independent evidence of the individual's guilt, not
by compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself.326 In fact,
convictions obtained by the use of involuntary confessions cannot stand
regardless of whether the confession was true. The focus of the
320. The authors used the phrases "sexually violent predatory criminal behavior"
interchangeably with "sexually violent criminal behavior." This is a more reasonable
interpretation of the Act. Indeed, this explanation is supported by the Legislature's use
of the phrases "sexually violent predatory criminal behavior" and "acts of sexual
violence" within one paragraph in subdivision (a) of section 6602. Id. at § 6602(a).
321. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 606.
322. Amendment V of the Constitution of the United States provides in relevant
part, "No person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ...." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Article I, section 15, of the California
Constitution provides in relevant part, "Persons may not... be compelled in criminal
cause to be a witness against themselves." CAL. CONST. art. 1. § 15.
323. See Cramer v. Tyars, 588 P.2d 793,796 (Cal. 1979).
324. See id.
325. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 541 (1961).
326. See Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540-41.
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privilege is not the veracity of the statement, but the methods used to
obtain them. Any statement obtained by the use of coercion, whether
physical or psychological, offends a fundamental principle of our
criminal jurisprudence."'
Nevertheless, it is also the case that "no witness has a privilege to
refuse to reveal to the trier of fact his... mental characteristics where
they are relevant to the issues under consideration."3"' When issues
about an individual's mental status arise in the civil context, the
privilege simply does not apply.329 Thus, traditional civil commitment,
which involves issues of the accused's mental condition, generally does
not require application of the privilege against self-incrimination.33
With these guidelines in place, the issues that need to be addressed are
whether the individual has a Fifth Amendment privilege at two distinct
periods in the process outlined by the Act: (1) at the mandatory section
6601 psychiatric evaluation to determine whether the individual has a
diagnosed mental disorder which will result in evidence to be used at
any trial, and (2) at the civil trial. Each of these issues will be discussed
in turn.
b. Respondent Does Not Have a Constitutional Right to Refuse to
Answer Questions at the Section 6601 Inquiry
At the initial stages of the identification process, the Act requires a
"full evaluation" of the individual by mental health experts.' The
person is interviewed by two psychiatrists or psychologists using a
standardized assessment protocol to decide whether the person has a
diagnosed mental disorder, is likely to reoffend, is dangerous to others,
and requires treatment.3 2 Questions will delve into the person's criminal
and psychosexual history, the type, degree, and duration of any sexual
deviance, and the type, severity, and history of the mental disorder.33 A
meaningful evaluation of the individual's mental condition wil often
depend upon an assessment of numerous incidents, some long in the
past. It is possible that some uncharged criminal conduct, as well as
adjudicated crimes, will be discussed. At issue is the subject's entire
lifetime behavioral pattern, not whether a certain act was committed.
Although criminal conduct is necessarily bound up in every case, the
327. See id. at 541.
328. Cramer, 588 P.2d at 796.
329. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 372.
330. See id.
331. CAL. ,VELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
332. See id. § 660 1(c), (d).
333. See id. § 6601(c).
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focus of the inquiry is not on the particular criminal acts, but on the
mental condition of the individual indicated by these disclosures. The
opinion or diagnosis of the experts turns on their interpretation of the
information given by the individual.M
Thus, the interview is not designed to gather evidence that the
individual has committed criminal offenses in the past. Rather, the
inquiry is into the individual's mental state so that the expert can offer
an opinion, based any information they are given, that the individual
meets the criteria of a sexually violent predator.335
The SVPA is similar to the Act involved in Allen v. Illinois.36 That
Act337 dealt with individuals declared to be sexually dangerous
individuals, who had a mental disorder, and had a criminal propensity to
commit sex offenses.338 A petition for civil involuntary commitment,
declaring the individual a sexually dangerous person, was filed and the
individual was then subject to court-ordered interviews by two
psychiatrists.3 At the subsequent trial, these experts testified to the
information obtained from the individual despite the objection that it
was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.4°
Because of the Act's clearly civil nature, the Supreme Court found
that the privilege did not apply34' and further emphasized the fact that
"traditional civil commitment does not require application of the
privilege."' 42 Furthermore, the Court also opined that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process does not alter this conclusion. 43
That protection is concerned with ensuring reliability, as shown above.
4
"[T]he Fifth Amendment [privilege] is not designed to enhance the
reliability of the factfinding determination." ' In fact, the Court in Allen
334. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,429 (1979).
335. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6601(a), (b); Cramer v. Tyars, 588 P.2d
793, 797 (Cal. 1979).
336. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
337. The Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. See id. at 364.
338. See id. at 366 n.1.
339. See id.
340. See id. at 366.
341. See id. at 372.
342. Id.
343. See id. at 374 ("This Court has never held that the Due Process Clause of its
own force requires application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a non-
criminal proceeding ... ").
344. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
345. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375.
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adopted the view that "denying the evaluating psychiatrist the
opportunity to question persons alleged to be sexually dangerous would
decrease the reliability of a finding of sexual dangerousness. ' ' 6
However, an important caveat must be noted.37 Allen did not address
the issue whether incriminatory statements made concerning
unadjudicated crimes or unadjudicated elements of charged crimes made
by an individual would be admissible at his civil trial proceeding as not
violative of the individual's Fifth Amendment rights. That issue was not
addressed because the trial court in Allen had ruled that the individual's
statements to the psychiatrists were not themselves admissible and the
state supreme court ruled that any of the individual's statements to the
psychiatrists could not be used against him in any subsequent criminal
proceeding.38 Thus, there was no need for the Supreme Court in Allen to
address that issuer 9 Moreover, the Court in Allen relied on the state
supreme court rulings as part of the reason for its conclusion that the
privilege did not apply.350 The Court in Allen stated: "This Court has
never held that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires
application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a noncriminal
proceeding, where the privilege claimant is protected against his
compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case. We decline to do
so today."
351
Thus, Allen suggests that even though an individual subject to
commitment does not have a Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to
answer questions presented to him at the compulsory psychiatric
346. Id. at 374-75.
347. It should be noted that even though the interview is "compulsory," in that the
statute provides for it, that is not the type of compulsion meant for Fifth Amendment
purposes. In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), the Court
stated that the Fifth Amendment protects only against compelled self-incrimination. Id.
at 287. "Compulsion," as the term is used in the Fifth Amendment, does not include a
statement made as the result of decisions or choices generated by the criminal procedural
system. Whether there are pressures which "push" a defendant to testify is not
"compulsion" for Fifth Amendment purposes. See id.
348. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 367-68.
349. The Court of Appeal in People v. Leonard, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 180 (Ct. App.
2000), held that the United States Supreme Court in Allen had decided this issue. Id. at
189-90. But the court in Leonard failed to note or discuss this aspect of the lower trial
court's ruling in Allen, and also failed to discuss that the Supreme Court relied on that
fact in reaching its decision in Allen.
350. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 366-74 (discussing the lower court's holdings). 'The
trial court ruled that petitioner's statements to the psychiatrists were not themselves
admissible, but allowed each psychiatrist to give his opinion based upon his interview
with petitioner." Id. at 366. "The [State Supreme Court of Illinois] held that 'a
defendant's statement to a psychiatrist in a compulsory examination under the provisions
here involved may not be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceedings.'"
Id. at 367-68.
351. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
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interview, any incriminatory statements made by him at that time to
those interviewers should not be admitted at his subsequent trial, nor
should they be a predicate for future criminal proceedings.
This conclusion would preserve an individual's constitutional rights
and at the same time preserve the reliability of the proceedings. Any
answers given to the expert by the individual may provide clues to the
individual's mental state on which the experts consider in order to render
their opinion as to whether the individual has a mental disorder and is
dangerous to others. A reliable determination of the individual's mental
state is possible only with that person's active cooperation. The
individual is asked questions so that the expert can gain insight into his
personality, psychological history, mental state, and emotions. Whether
the individual has a mental disorder, is dangerous, and is in need of
treatment, ultimately depends upon information that can only be gleaned
from the person subject to commitment. "[D]enying the evaluating
psychiatrist the opportunity to question persons alleged to be sexually
dangerous would decrease the reliability of a finding of sexual
dangerousness." '352 If that occurred, the psychiatrist would be limited to
secondhand information such as probation reports or, if available, prior
medical records. Clearly, if mental health experts were limited to this
latter approach, the proceedings would be undermined and frustrated.
For these reasons (and because of the authorities cited) the privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply to the section 6601 compulsory
interviews. However, if in the course of those interviews the individual
supplies answers, which cover any non-adjudicated aspect of his former
crimes, or supplies information about uncharged criminal activity, those
responses should be inadmissible at the sexually violent predator's trial
and should not be used as a predicate for criminal prosecution.3
c. Respondent May Be Called as a Witness by the Prosecution
As stated earlier, no individual has a privilege to refuse to reveal to the
trier of fact his mental characteristics when they are relevant to the
issues under consideration? 4 And, because proceedings under the
352. Id. at 374-75; see Leonard, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at
374-75).
353. See Tippettv. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1161 n.6 (4th Cir. 1971).
354. See Cramer v. Tyars, 588 P.2d 793, 796 (Cal. 1979); People v. Merfeld, 67
Cal. Rptr. 2d 759, 762-63 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that privilege does not prevent
calling and questioning an individual about his mental state at trial to determine whether
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Sexually Violent Predator Act are civil, the respondent does not have an
absolute right not to be called as a witness and not to testify.355 The
respondent would be required to respond to any non-incriminatory
questioning which may reveal his current and past mental state to the
trier of fact.356
Reason and common sense suggest that it is appropriate under such
circumstances that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be
committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it may make an
informed judgment .... The receipt of such evidence may be analogized to the
disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence and may in fact be the
most reliable proof and probative indicator of the person's present mental
condition. Similarly, a defendant even in a criminal proceeding may be
required to give "real or physical" evidence in contrast to "communications or
testimony" in the sense of disclosing knowledge.
357
Nor would the individual's statements to the mental health experts
during the section 6601 interview be inadmissible.358 Those statements
are not privileged under the patient-psychotherapist section of the
Evidence Code359 since the individual is not a patient for the purposes of
the interview. 3'0 Also, when there is reasonable cause to believe the
person presents a current danger to others, there is no privilege.36'
Moreover, no privilege exists when the mental health expert is required
to report such findings to ayublic agency, as herein, and the report is
open to public inspection. Finally, the interviews would not be
confidential since they are not taken in the course of providing services
363or treatment, but for an initial diagnosis.
Yet the person subject to commitment still retains the right, as does
any witness, to refuse to answer any question that may tend to
his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) should be extended); People
v. Collins, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 773-74 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Of course, this privilege does
not apply to revelation of the witness's physical or mental characteristics where they are
relevant to the issues being considered.").
355. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2962, 2966, 2972 (West 1999); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6500 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); Allen, 478 U.S. at 375; Leonard, 93 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 190; Merfeld, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
356. See Cramer, 588 P.2d at 797-98; Merfeld, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
357. Cramer, 588 P.2d 798 (citation omitted).
358. Provided they are not incriminatory.
359. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West 1995).
360. See id. § 1011. The individual in a section 6601 interview did not consult the
expert and did not submit to the examination for the purpose of scientific research.
361. See id. § 1024; Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786, 789 (Cal. 1992);
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976).
362. See CAL. EvrD. CODE § 1026; Lemelle v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 450,
456 n.2 (Ct. App. 1978). There is a specific exception to the patient-psychotherapist
privilege for the psychiatric interviews conducted in MDO proceedings, but the
Legislature did not provide a comparable exception for SVPA proceedings. See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1017.
363. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5328 (West 1998).
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incriminate him in any criminal activity and might subject him to
criminal prosecution. This would include the fact that the individual
may not be compelled to answer questions about any unadjudicated
crimes, uncharged acts, or elements of his prior convictions that were
unadjudicated.3"
For example, subdivision (b) of section 6600 requires a determination
that the prior sexually violent offenses for which the person received a
sentence were committed by the use of "force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury."36 Since some of those
listed offenses do not have these characteristics as part of their
elements,36 those findings would be subject to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at the individual's civil commitment trial. "To the
extent that the necessary elements... may be established by evidence of
criminal conduct, such evidence must, in its entirety, be elicited from
sources other than the individual who is the subject of the commitment
proceeding."'3 67
This same conclusion would apply to any of the elements that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial and which would be
established by evidence of criminal conduct. To this extent, and only to
this extent, the Fifth Amendment would apply.
If perchance, such questions are asked and answers given, then the
individual should be protected against the use of the compelled answers
in any subsequent criminal case. For the same reasons, any answers
should not be used as predicates for new criminal charges.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons and arguments previously stated, it is recommended
that the Act be amended in the following ways. The definition of a
sexually violent predator should be clarified by adding "predatory" to
those references of sexually violent prior offenses. Either the phrase
"determinate sentence" should be eliminated from the definition of a
sexually violent predator, or the definition should be amended as
suggested in Part III of this Article. Finally, the evidentiary standard
required for the finding that an individual is a sexually violent predator
364. See Cramer v. Tyars, 588 P.2d 793,798 (Cal. 1979).
365. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 1998).
366. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a), (b) (West 1999) (listing lewd act upon a
child); id. § 286 (listing sodomy); id. § 288(a) (oral copulation).
367. Cramer, 588 P.2d at 797.
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should be changed to require proof, both in the definition of a sexually
violent predator and in the definition of a diagnosed mental disorder, of
a likelihood that the individual will engage in predatory sexually violent
criminal behavior.
These changes would not only eliminate internal inconsistencies
currently present in the Act, but would also clarify the elements subject
to proof and lessen disagreement among the trial courts on these issues.
This, in turn, would save court time and eliminate appellate review. For
these reasons, the Legislature should revisit the Act with these
recommendations in mind.
1116
